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Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy that is characterized by an announced numerical inflation
target, an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an inflation forecast and has
been called forecast targeting, and a high degree of transparency and accountability. It was introduced
in New Zealand in 1990, has been very successful in terms of stabilizing both inflation and the real
economy, and has, as of 2010, been adopted by about 25 industrialized and emerging-market economies.
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01. Introduction
Inﬂation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy that was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. It
has been very successful in stabilizing both inﬂation and the real economy. As of 2010 it has been
adopted by around 25 industrialized and non-industrialized countries. It is characterized by (1)
an announced numerical inﬂation target, (2) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a
major role to an inﬂation forecast and has been called forecast targeting, and (3) a high degree
of transparency and accountability (Svensson (2008)). Inﬂation targeting is highly associated with
an institutional framework that is characterized by the trinity of (1) a mandate for price stability,
(2) independence, and (3) accountability for the central bank, but there are examples of highly
successful inﬂation targeters, such as Norges Bank, that lack formal independence (although their
de facto independence may still be substantial).
1.1. An announced numerical inﬂation target
The numerical inﬂation target is for advanced countries typically around 2 percent at an annual
rate for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or core CPI, in the form of a range, such as 1-3 percent in
New Zealand; or a point target with a range, such as a 2 percent point target with a range/tolerance
interval of ±1 percentage points in Canada; or a point target without any explicit range, such as
2 percent in Sweden and the U.K. and 2.5 percent in Norway. The diﬀerence between these forms
does not seem to matter in practice. A central bank with a target range seems to aim for the middle
of the range. The edges of the range are normally interpreted as “soft edges,” in the sense that
they do not trigger discrete policy changes and inﬂation just outside the range is not considered
much diﬀerent from just inside. Numerical inﬂation targets for emerging markets and developing
countries are typically a few percentage points higher than 2 percent.
In practice, inﬂation targeting is never “strict” but always “ﬂexible,” in the sense that all
inﬂation-targeting central banks (“central bank” is used here as the generic name for monetary
authority) not only aim at stabilizing inﬂation around the inﬂation target but also put some weight
on stabilizing the real economy, for instance, implicitly or explicitly stabilizing a measure of resource
utilization such as the output gap; that is, the gap between actual and potential output. Thus, the
“target variables” of the central bank include not only inﬂation but other variables as well, such
as the output gap.1 The objectives under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting seem well approximated by a
1 The term “inﬂation nutter” for a central bank that is only concerned about stabilizing inﬂation was introduced in
a paper by Mervyn King at a conference in Gerzensee, Switzerland, in 1995 and later published as King (1997). The
1standard quadratic loss function consisting of the sum of the squared inﬂation gap to the target
and a weight times the squared output gap, and possibly also a weight times squared policy-rate
changes (the last part corresponding to a preference for interest-rate smoothing).2 However, for
new inﬂation-targeting regimes, where the establishment of “credibility” is a priority, stabilizing
the real economy probably has less weight than when credibility has been established (more on
credibility below). Over time, when inﬂation targeting matures, it displays more ﬂexibility in the
sense of putting relatively more weight on stabilizing resource utilization. Inﬂation-targeting central
banks have also become increasingly transparent about being ﬂexible inﬂation targeters. Section
4.1 discusses some such developments of inﬂation targeting.
1.2. Forecast targeting
Because there is a lag between monetary-policy actions (such as a policy-rate change) and its
impact on the central bank’s target variables, monetary policy is more eﬀective if it is guided by
forecasts. The implementation of inﬂation targeting therefore gives a main role to forecasts of
inﬂation and other target variables. It can be described as forecast targeting, that is, setting the
policy rate (more precisely, deciding on a policy-rate path) such that the forecasts of the target
variables conditional on that policy-rate path “look good”, where “look good” means that the
forecast for inﬂation stabilizes inﬂation around the inﬂation target and the forecast for resource
utilization stabilizes resource utilization around a normal level.3
1.3. A high degree of transparency and accountability
Inﬂation targeting is characterized by a high degree of transparency. Typically, an inﬂation-
targeting central bank publishes a regular monetary-policy report which includes the bank’s forecast
of inﬂation and other variables, a summary of its analysis behind the forecasts, and the motivation
for its policy decisions. Some inﬂation-targeting central banks also provide some information on,
or even forecasts of, its likely future policy decisions.
This high degree of transparency is exceptional in view of the history of central banking. Tra-
ditionally, central-bank objectives, deliberations, and even policy decisions have been subject to
terms “strict” and “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting were to my knowledge ﬁrst introduced in a paper of mine presented
at a conference at the bank of Portugal in 1996, later published as Svensson (1999b).
2 The policy rate (instrument rate) is the short nominal interest rate that the central bank sets to implement
monetary policy.
3 The idea that inﬂation targeting implies that the inﬂation forecast can be seen as an intermediate target was
introduced in King (1994). The term “inﬂation-forecast targeting” was introduced in Svensson (1997), and the term
“forecast targeting” in Svensson (2005). See Woodford (2007) and Woodford (2010a) for more discussion and analysis
of forecast targeting.
2considerable secrecy. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd any reasons for that secrecy beyond central bankers’ de-
sire not to be subject to public scrutiny (including scrutiny and possible pressure from governments
or legislative bodies). The current emphasis on transparency is based on the insight that monetary
policy to a very large extent is the “management of expectations.” Monetary policy has an impact
on the economy mostly through the private-sector expectations that current monetary-policy ac-
tions and announcements give rise to. The level of the policy rate for the next few weeks matter
very little to most economic agents. What matters is the expectations of future policy rates, which
expectations aﬀect longer interest rates that do matter for economic decisions and activity.
Furthermore, private-sector expectations of inﬂation aﬀect current pricing decisions and inﬂa-
tion for the next few quarters. Therefore, the anchoring of private-sector inﬂation expectations
on the inﬂation target is a crucial precondition for the stability of actual inﬂation. The proximity
of private-sector inﬂation expectations to the inﬂation target is often referred to as the “credibil-
ity” of the inﬂation-targeting regime. Inﬂation-targeting central banks sometimes appear to be
obsessed by such credibility, but this obsession is for good reason. If a central bank succeeds in
achieving credibility, a good part of the battle to control inﬂation is already won. A high degree of
transparency and high-quality, convincing monetary-policy reports are often considered essential to
establishing and maintaining credibility. Furthermore, a high degree of credibility gives the central
bank more freedom to be “ﬂexible” and also stabilize the real economy (see Svensson (2002) for
more discussion).
Whereas many central banks in the past seem to have actively avoided accountability, for in-
stance by not having explicit objectives and by being very secretive, inﬂation targeting is normally
associated with a high degree of accountability. A high degree of accountability is now considered
generic to inﬂation targeting and an important component in strengthening the incentives faced by
inﬂation-targeting central banks to achieve their objectives. The explicit objectives and the trans-
parency of monetary-policy reporting contribute to increased public scrutiny of monetary policy.
In several countries inﬂation-targeting central banks are subject to more explicit accountability.
In New Zealand, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is subject to a Policy Target
Agreement, an explicit agreement between the Governor and the government on the Governor’s
responsibilities. In the U.K., the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s remit to the Bank of England
instructs the Bank to write a public letter explaining any deviation from the target larger than
one percentage point and what actions the Bank is taking in response to the deviation. In several
countries, central-bank oﬃcials are subject to public hearings in the Parliament where monetary
3policy is scrutinized; and in several countries, monetary policy is regularly or occasionally subject
to extensive reviews by independent experts (for instance, New Zealand, the U.K., Norway, and
Sweden).4
1.4. Outline
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy discusses the short history of inﬂation
targeting and the macroeconomic eﬀects of inﬂation targeting so far. Section 3 presents a theory of
inﬂation targeting and “forecast targeting” more generally, where projections of the target variables
(inﬂation and resource utilization) take center stage and where the policy problem is to choose a
policy-rate path rather than a policy function so as to minimize a forecast. The section also
discusses the role of uncertainty about the state of the economy and the model of the transmission
mechanism, and the role and use of judgment in monetary policy. Section 4 discusses the practice
of inﬂation targeting, more precisely the developments of practical inﬂation targeting since its
inception in 1990 in New Zealand, the special issue of the publication of policy-rate paths, and
the examples of Sveriges Riksbank (the central bank of Sweden), which is ranked as one of the
world’s most transparent central banks, and Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway), which is
al a t e - c o m e rt ot h ei n ﬂation-targeting camp but is a pioneer in applying explicit optimal policy as
an input in the policy decision. These two examples are also chosen because I know more about
them than about other inﬂation targeters. The section also reports on the debate and research
on possible preconditions for emerging-market economies to join the inﬂation-targeting camp. The
ﬁnal section, section 5, discusses two potential future issues for inﬂation targeting, whether it would
be advantageous to move on to price-level targeting and whether inﬂation targeting needs to be
modiﬁed in the light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and deep recession.
2. History and macroeconomic eﬀects
So far, since its inception in the early 1990s in New Zealand, Canada, the U.K., and Sweden,
inﬂation targeting has been a considerable success, as measured by the stability of inﬂation and the
stability of the real economy. There is no evidence that inﬂation targeting has been detrimental
to growth, productivity, employment, or other measures of economic performance. The success is
4 Reviews of monetary policy or aspects thereof include, for New Zealand, Svensson (2001), for the U.K., Kohn
(2008), for Norway, the annual Norges Bank Watch, for instance, Svensson, Houg, Solheim, and Steigum (2002),
and for Sweden, Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006). Svensson (2010a) provides a general discussion of the evaluation of
inﬂation targeting, including the possibility of continuous real-time evaluation.
4both absolute and relative to alternative monetary-policy strategies, such as exchange-rate targeting
or money-growth targeting. No country has so far abandoned inﬂation targeting after adopting it
(except to join the euro area), or even expressed any regrets.5 For both industrial and non-industrial
countries, inﬂation targeting has proved to be a most ﬂexible and resilient monetary-policy regime
and has succeeded in surviving a number of large shocks and disturbances, including the recent
ﬁnancial crisis and deep recession.67
Although inﬂation targeting has been a success in stabilizing both inﬂation and the real economy
in the small- and medium-sized industrial countries that have introduced it, the United States, the
euro area, and Japan have not yet adopted all the explicit characteristics of inﬂation-targeting, but
they all seem to be taking steps in that direction. Reservations against inﬂation targeting have
mainly suggested that it might give too much weight to inﬂation stabilization to the detriment of
the stability of the real economy or other possible monetary-policy objectives. The fact that real-
world inﬂation targeting is ﬂexible rather than strict and the empirical success of inﬂation targeting
in the countries where it has been implemented seem to confound those reservations (Roger and
Stone (2005)).
A possible alternative to inﬂation targeting is money-growth targeting; that is, the central
bank has an explicit target for the growth of the money supply. Money-growth targeting has been
tried in several countries but been abandoned, since practical experience has consistently shown
that the relation between money growth and inﬂation is too unstable and unreliable for money-
growth targeting to provide successful inﬂation stabilization. Although Germany’s Bundesbank
oﬃcially conducted money-growth targeting for many years, it often deliberately missed its money-
growth target in order to achieve its inﬂation target, and is therefore arguably better described
5 However, there has certainly been some criticism of aspects of inﬂation targeting in some countries and over
time considerable developments, some in response to criticism, within the practice of inﬂation targeting (see section
4.1).
6 As summarized by Rose (2007): “A stable international monetary system has emerged since the early 1990s.
A large number of industrial and a growing number of developing countries now have domestic inﬂation targets
administered by independent and transparent central banks. These countries place few restrictions on capital mobility
and allow their exchange rates to ﬂoat. The domestic focus of monetary policy in these countries does not have any
obvious international cost. Inﬂation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility and less frequent ‘sudden stops’ of
capital ﬂows than similar countries that do not target inﬂation. Inﬂa t i o nt a r g e t i n gc o u n t r i e sa l s od on o th a v ec u r r e n t
accounts or international reserves that look diﬀerent from other countries. This system was not planned and does not
rely on international coordination. There is no role for a center country, the IMF, or gold. It is durable; in contrast
to other monetary regimes, no country has been forced to abandon an inﬂation-targeting regime. Succinctly, it is the
diametric opposite of the post-war system; Bretton Woods, reversed.”
7 A study from the IMF, Carvalho Filho (2010), gives a preliminary appraisal of how countries with inﬂation
targeting have fared during the current crisis. It ﬁnds that, since August 2008, IT countries lowered nominal policy
rates by more and this loosening translated into an even larger diﬀerential in real interest rates relative to other
countries. IT countries were less likely to face deﬂation scares and saw sharp real depreciations not associated
with a greater perception of risk by markets. There is also some weak evidence that IT countries did better on
unemployment rates and that advanced IT countries had relatively stronger industrial production performance and
higher GDP growth rates than their non-IT peers.
5as an implicit inﬂation targeter (see Svensson (1999c, 2009d) for more discussions and references).
Many small and medium-sized countries have tried exchange-rate targeting in the form of a ﬁxed
exchange rate, that is, ﬁxing the exchange rate relative to a center country with an independent
monetary policy. For several reasons, including increased international capital ﬂows and diﬃculties
in defending misaligned ﬁxed exchange rates against speculative attacks, ﬁxed exchange rates have
become less viable and less successful in stabilizing inﬂation. This has led many countries to instead
pursue inﬂation targeting with ﬂexible exchange rates.
2.1. History
New Zealand was the ﬁrst country to introduce an explicit inﬂation target. Like most OECD
countries, New Zealand had experienced high and variable inﬂation in the 1970s and the ﬁrst part
of the 1980s. Monetary policy was tightened and inﬂation fell in the latter part of 1980s. The
Reserve Bank Act of 1989 established the policy framework that is now call inﬂation targeting.
The key aspects of the framework were (1) an inﬂation target for monetary policy, (2) central
bank independence, (3) accountability of the central bank (through making the target public and
holding the Governor of the Reserve Bank responsible for achieving it). The framework chosen
was part of a more far-reaching reform of the central government administration in New Zealand.
As noted above, an institutional framework of the trinity of (1) a mandate for price stability,
(2) independence, and (3) accountability is highly associated with inﬂation targeting, although
there are examples of highly successful inﬂation targeters, such as Norges Bank, that lack formal
independence.
As noted by Goodhart (2010), “one of the most interesting facets of the 1989 RBNZ Act is
that one of the main motives for it did not come from monetary policy or monetary analysis at
all. Instead, intense dissatisfaction had developed with the intervention, meddling, and direct
(micro) management with all aspects of the economy by the previous (National) government, led
by Sir Robert Muldoon.” Thus, a signiﬁcant purpose of the Act was to make the Reserve Bank
“Muldoon-proof.” Although the formulation of the Reserve Bank Act received strong support from
Charles Goodhart, the path-breaking Act was the result of the eﬀorts of far-sighted policymakers
and civil servants of the Reserve Bank and Treasury in New Zealand rather than academic research
on suitable monetary-policy frameworks.8 Furthermore, as emphasized by Nelson (2005), until
8 Singleton, Hawke, and Grimes (2006) provides an authorative history of the origin of the Reserve Bank Act and
the development of the Reserve Bank and monetary policy in New Zealand 1973-2002. Goodhart (2010) discusses
the political economy of creation of the Act.
6the mid-1980s, many politicians, and policy circles generally, in New Zealand subscribed to a
nonmonetary view of inﬂation. Behind the introduction of the Reserve Bank Act was also a
fundamental change in policymaking doctrine from a nonmonetary to a monetary approach to
inﬂation analysis and control.
Inﬂation targeting spread quickly to other advanced economies, see table 2.1. Canada adopted
inﬂation targeting in 1991. The U.K. and Sweden adopted inﬂation targeting in 1992 and 1993
after currency crises and the collapse of their ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes. Finland and Australia
also adopted inﬂation targeting in 1993. By 2010, about 10 industrialized and 15 emerging-market
and developing countries had adopted explicit inﬂation targeting.9
Table 2.1: Approximate adoption dates of inﬂation targeting
Country Date Country Date
New Zealand 1990 q1 Korea 2001 m1
Canada 1991 m2 Mexico 2001 m1
United Kingdom 1992 m10 Iceland 2001 m3
Sweden 1993 m1 Norway 2001 m3
Finland 1993 m2 Hungary 2001 m6
Australia 1993 m4 Peru 2002 m1
Spain 1995 m1 Philippines 2002 m1
Israel 1997 m6 Guatemala 2005 m1
Czech Republic 1997 m12 Slovakia 2005 m1
Poland 1998 m10 Indonesia 2005 m7
Brazil 1999 m6 Romania 2005 m8
Chile 1999 m9 Turkey 2006 m1
Colombia 1999 m9 Serbia 2006 m9
South Africa 2000 m2 Ghana 2007 m5
Thailand 2000 m5
Source: Roger (2009)
While the new inﬂation targeters during the 1990s were mostly advanced economies, an increas-
ing number of developing and emerging-market economies have adopted inﬂation targeting since
1997. By 2010, the majority of inﬂation targeters were emerging-market and developing countries.
Among these countries, the shift toward inﬂation targeting has been a gradual process. In South
America, movement toward inﬂation targeting began in the early 1990s, but full-ﬂedged inﬂation
targeting was adopted only in the late 1990s and early 2000s, following the 1998 ﬁnancial crisis.
In Europe, the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe began introducing inﬂation
targeting in the late 1990s as part of their comprehensive economic reforms, while in East Asia,
9 Pétursson (2004b) and Freedman and Ötker-Robe (2009) provide an overview of the countries’ back-
ground/motivation for adopting inﬂation targeting. See also Freedman and Laxton (2009).
7inﬂation targeting began to be adopted in the early 2000s as countries emerged from monetary tar-
geting under International Monetary Fund-supported programs following the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial
crisis. Inﬂation targeting will probably continue to spread among emerging-market economies and
developing economies.
As mentioned above, the U.S., the euro area, and Japan have not yet adopted all the explicit
characteristics of inﬂation targeting, but they have all taken steps in that direction, and the practical
remaining diﬀerences to explicit inﬂation targeting are arguably small. As noted by Walsh (2009a),
“... even if no additional central banks adopt inﬂation targeting, or if some current inﬂation
targeters abandon it, inﬂation targeting will have had a lasting impact on the way central banks
operate. Even among central banks that do not consider themselves inﬂation targeters, many of
the policy innovations associated with inﬂation targeting are now common. Most prominently,
transparency has spread from inﬂation targeters to non-inﬂation targeters.”
2.2. Macroeconomic eﬀects
Early empirical work on the macroeconomic eﬀects of inﬂation targeting provided some support
for the view that inﬂation targeting improves macroeconomic performance (for instance, Bernanke,
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Neumann
and von Hagen (2002), and Truman (2003)), but these studies suﬀer from having a relatively small
number of observations. In the following I brieﬂy summarize some more recent studies.
2.2.1. Inﬂation
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot average inﬂation for inﬂation targeting and non-inﬂation-targeting OECD
countries and for a group of emerging-market economies, respectively.10 Evidently, all groups of
countries have enjoyed lower and more stable inﬂation. However, there seems to be a diﬀerence
between the inﬂation targeters and the non-inﬂation targeters in the two groups. For the OECD
countries, the development is more or less the same for inﬂation targeters and non-inﬂation tar-
geters. For the emerging-market economies, inﬂa t i o ni nt h eg r o u po fi n ﬂation targeters has come
down from a higher level than in the non-inﬂation targeting countries.
10 In ﬁgure 2.1, all countries with hyper-inﬂation periods are excluded. Inﬂation targeters: Australia, Canada,
Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Non-inﬂation targeters: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. (The OECD countries excluded are thus
Iceland, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey.)
In ﬁgure 2.2, the inﬂation targeters include: Chile, Columbia, Indonesia, Israel, South Africa, Mexico, Philippines,
and Thailand. The non-inﬂation targeters in 2.2 include: China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, India, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Tunisia, Singapore, and Taiwan.
8Figure 2.1: Average inﬂa t i o ni ni n ﬂation targeting and non-inﬂation targeting OECD-countries.


























Formal empirical analysis reaﬃrms the visual impression from the ﬁgures. Ball and Sheridan
(2005), Lin and Ye (2007), and Angeriz and Arestis (2008) consider subgroups of the OECD-
countries and ﬁnd that the eﬀects of inﬂation targeting on average inﬂation and inﬂation variability
is insigniﬁcant. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) ﬁnd the same for the OECD countries in their
sample.11 Batini and Laxton (2007), Gonçalves and Salles (2008), and Lin and Ye (2009) consider
groups of emerging-market economies and ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀect of inﬂation targeting on average
inﬂa t i o na n dt y p i c a l l ya l s oo ni n ﬂation variability.12
As pointed out by Gertler (2005) in the discussion of Ball and Sheridan (2005), many of the
non-inﬂation targeters in OECD sample (if not just about all) have adopted monetary policies that
are very similar in practice to formal inﬂation targeting. This lack of sharpness in the classiﬁcation
scheme make the results for the OECD-countries hard to interpret. In fact, it may suggest the
opposite conclusion, namely that inﬂation targeting has indeed been quite eﬀective for the OECD
countries. Empirical studies using samples including both OECD and developing/emerging-market
economies typically ﬁnd beneﬁcial eﬀects of inﬂation targeting on average inﬂation and inﬂation
volatility (for instance, Hyvonen (2004), Pétursson (2004a), Vega and Winkelried (2005), Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), and Pétursson (2009)).
11 Fang, Miller, and Lee (2009) consider OECD countries and include lagged eﬀects of inﬂation targeting. They
report signiﬁcant evidence that inﬂation targeting does lower inﬂation rates for the targeting countries in the short
run. The eﬀects occur after the year of adopting inﬂation targeting and decay gradually.
12 Surprisingly, Gonçalves and Salles (2008) does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of inﬂation targeting on the volatility
of inﬂation.
9Figure 2.2: Average inﬂa t i o ni ni n ﬂation targeting and non-inﬂation-targeting emerging economies.

























There is relatively robust empirical evidence that an explicit numerical target for inﬂation an-
chors and stabilizes inﬂation expectations (Johnson (2002), Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004),
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006), Batini and Laxton (2007), Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder,
and Swanson (2007), and Ravenna (2008)). In particular, Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006)
compare the behavior of daily bond yield data in the U.K. and Sweden (both inﬂation targeters) to
that in the U.S. (a non-inﬂation targeter). They use the diﬀerence between far-ahead forward rates
on nominal and inﬂation-indexed bonds as a measure of compensation for expected inﬂation and
inﬂation risk at long horizons. For the U.S., they ﬁnd that forward inﬂation compensation exhibits
highly signiﬁcant responses to economic news. For the U.K., they ﬁnd a level of sensitivity similar to
that in the U.S. prior to the Bank of England gaining independence in 1997, but a striking absence
of such sensitivity since the central bank became independent. For Sweden, they ﬁnd that forward
inﬂation compensation has been insensitive to economic news over the whole period for which they
have data. These ﬁndings support the view that a well-known and credible inﬂation target helps
to anchor the private sector’s long-run inﬂation expectations. Recently, International Monetary
Fund (2008) considered which monetary-policy frameworks had been most successful in anchoring
inﬂation expectations in the wake of the oil and food price shocks in 2007, and found that “in
emerging economies, inﬂation targeting seems to have recently been more eﬀective than alternative
10monetary-policy frameworks in anchoring expectations.” Table 2.2 reports the percentage-point
response of expected headline inﬂation 1, 3, 5 and 6—10 years ahead to a 1 percentage-point change
in actual inﬂation for emerging-market economies. In inﬂation-targeting emerging economies, the
response of expected headline inﬂation 1, 3, and 5 years ahead is zero, whereas it is positive for
non-inﬂation targeters.
Table 2.2: Changes in expected inﬂation in response to changes in actual inﬂa t i o ni ne m e r g i n g -
market economies.
1 year 3 years 5 years 6-10 years
Inﬂation targeters 000 000 000 0024
Non-inﬂation targeters 023 012 007 000
Note: Expected inﬂation 1, 3, 5, and 6—10 years ahead; percentage-
point responses to a 1 percentage point change in actual inﬂation.
Source: International Monetary Fund (2008, ﬁgure 3.12)
2.2.3. Output
Skeptics of inﬂation targeting worry that the regime is too focused on inﬂation and that attempts
to control inﬂation will generate instability in the real economy and possibly also lower growth
(see, for instance, Friedman and Kuttner (1996), Friedman (2002), and Cecchetti and Ehrmann
(2002)). Figure 2.3 shows the average output growth and volatility before and after the adoption
of inﬂation targeting for inﬂation-targeting countries in OECD and for a group of emerging-market
economies.13 It also gives the output performance for the non-inﬂation targeting (NT) countries in
OECD and for the NT countries in the group of emerging-market economies. For the NT countries,
the threshold years are 1998 for the OECD countries and 2001 for the emerging-markets economies.
The panels give no basis for the pessimistic claim that inﬂation targeting adversely aﬀects growth
or average growth volatility.
Formal empirical analysis conﬁrms the impression from the ﬁgure. Ball and Sheridan (2005)
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of inﬂation targeting on average output growth or output volatility in
their sample of 20 OECD countries.14 However, as for the results on inﬂation discussed above,
the lack of sharpness in the classiﬁcation scheme for the OECD-countries makes the results hard
to interpret. Goncalves and Carvalho (2009) show that among 30 OECD countries the inﬂation-
13 T h eg r o u po fc o u n t r i e sa r et h es a m ea si nﬁgures 2.1 and 2.2 (see footnote 10).
14 Fang, Miller, and Lee (2009) ﬁnd that the inﬂation targeters in their sample of OECD countries achieve lower
output growth and higher output-growth variability in the short run while this eﬀect disappears in the longer run.
11Figure 2.3: Output performance before (left bar) and after (right bar) adoption of inﬂation targeting
before and after 1998 (OECD) and 2001 (emerging markets). Average and standard deviation of
growth, percent per year. Source: EcoWin.
























d. Emerging markets: Growth volatility
targeting countries suﬀer smaller output losses in terms of sacriﬁce ratios during disinﬂationary
periods than non-targeting counterparts. According to their estimates a targeter saves around 7
percent in output losses relative to a non-targeter for each percentage point of inﬂation decline.
Batini and Laxton (2007) and Gonçalves and Salles (2008) consider emerging-market economies
and ﬁnd that inﬂation targeting reduce the volatility in output growth/the output gap. There is
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of inﬂation targeting on growth.
2.2.4. Summary of eﬀects of inﬂation targeting
While macroeconomic experiences among both inﬂation targeting and non-inﬂation targeting de-
veloped economies have been similar, inﬂation targeting has improved macroeconomic performance
among developing economies. Importantly, there is no evidence that inﬂation targeting has been
detrimental to growth, productivity, employment, or other measures of economic performance in
either developed and developing economies. Inﬂation targeting has stabilized long-run inﬂation
12expectations. No country has so far abandoned inﬂation targeting after adopting it (except to join
the euro area), or even expressed any regrets. For both industrial and non-industrial countries,
inﬂation targeting has proved to be a most ﬂexible and resilient monetary-policy regime, and has
succeeded in surviving a number of large shocks and disturbances, including the recent ﬁnancial
crisis and deep recession.15 The success is both absolute and relative to alternative monetary-policy
strategies, such as exchange-rate targeting or money-growth targeting.
3. Theory
As mentioned above, in practice, inﬂation targeting is never “strict” but always “ﬂexible”, in the
sense that all inﬂation-targeting central banks not only aim at stabilizing inﬂation around the
inﬂation target but also put some weight on stabilizing the real economy, for instance, implicitly or
explicitly stabilizing a measure of resource utilization such as the output gap between actual output
and potential output. Thus, the target variables of the central bank include not only inﬂation but
other variables as well, such as the output gap. The objectives under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
seem well approximated by a quadratic loss function consisting of the sum of the squared inﬂation
deviation from target and a weight times the squared output gap, and possibly also a weight
times the squared policy-rate change (the last part corresponding to a preference for interest-rate
smoothing).
Because there is a lag between monetary-policy actions (such as a policy-rate change) and its
impact on the central bank’s target variables, monetary policy is more eﬀective if it is guided by
forecasts. The implementation of inﬂation targeting therefore gives a main role to forecasts of
inﬂation and other target variables. It can be described as forecast targeting, that is, setting the
policy rate (more precisely, deciding on a policy-rate path) such that the forecasts of the target
variables conditional on that policy-rate path stabilize both inﬂation around the inﬂation target
and resource utilization around a normal level.
Because of the clear objective, the high degree of transparency and accountability, and a sys-
tematic and elaborate decision process using the most advanced theoretical and empirical methods
as well as a sizeable amount of judgment, inﬂation targeting provides stronger possibilities and
incentives to achieve optimal monetary policy than previous monetary-policy regimes. Therefore,
at h e o r yo fi n ﬂation targeting is to a large extent a theory of optimal policy, with the objective
function given by the objective function of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting.
15 See footnote 7.
13However, there are a few aspects that make inﬂation targeting diﬀer from standard textbook
treatments of optimal policy that I would like to take into account. Textbook optimal policy
consists of setting up an optimization problem, where the objective function is maximized subject
to the model of the economy once and for all, which results in an optimal policy function that
expresses the policy rate(s) as a function of the state of the economy. The implementation of the
optimal policy then consists of mechanically setting the policy rate according to the optimal policy
function, assuming that the private sector understands and believes that policy is set that way and
can use that and other information to form rational expectations.
This textbook approach to optimal policy does not rely on forecasts. However, in inﬂation
targeting, forecasts take a central place. Indeed, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting can be said to consist
of choosing at each policy decision not only a policy rate but a whole (explicitly or implicit,
announced or not) policy-rate path such that the forecast of inﬂation conditional on that policy-rate
path stabilizes inﬂation around the inﬂation target and the forecast of the real economy stabilizes
resource utilization around a normal level. Thus, forecasts are essential tools in the policy process,
and policy is not about picking a policy function once and for all and then following it but about
picking a policy-rate path at each policy decision.
Thus, the theory I will try to develop in this section will emphasize the use of forecasts and
that the object of choice is, counter to most theory of optimal policy, not a policy function but
ap o l i c y - r a t epath. First, I will start from the standard treatment of optimal monetary policy in
a linear-quadratic setting. Then I will emphasize the role of forecasts, reformulate the optimal
policy problem in terms of choice between alternative feasible projections. I will show how the
optimal policy projection and the set of feasible forecasts can be illustrated with the help of a
modiﬁed Taylor curve, a forecast Taylor curve, which is closely related to the original Taylor
curve in Taylor (1979) that illustrates the tradeoﬀ between stabilizing inﬂation and stabilizing the
output gap. Then I will brieﬂy discuss so-called targeting rules and take up some issues about
implementation and determinacy of the equilibrium. Although most of the discussion is under the
assumption of commitment in a timeless equilibrium (Woodford 2003, 2010b), I will also brieﬂy
discuss optimization under discretion and degrees of commitment. Finally, I will discuss issues of
uncertainty and the application of judgment in monetary policy.
I am not implying that the policy of all inﬂation-targeting central banks are well described
by this theory.16 The theory is by nature an idealization, in a similar way in which standard
16 Although most inﬂation-targeting policymakers would probably agree that inﬂation targeting is about choosing
14consumption theory is an idealization of actual consumer behavior. The theory is a theory of ma-
ture inﬂation targeting, a theory of my view of what is potential best-practice inﬂation targeting,
although not quite yet actual best-practice inﬂation targeting. But I believe actual inﬂation tar-
geting, with one innovation and improvement after another, is moving in this direction, and that
some inﬂation-targeting central bank are pretty close. In section 4, I will discuss the developments
of practical inﬂation targeting and give some indication that inﬂation targeting in Norway and
Sweden, for instance, may not be far from this theory.
Since there may still be some misunderstandings of what real-world inﬂation targeting is, let me
also emphasize and repeat two things that inﬂation targeting is not.17 First, real-world inﬂation
targeting is not strict inﬂation targeting, that is, it does not have a loss function such as  =
( − ∗)2,w h e r e denotes inﬂation in period  and ∗ is the inﬂation target. That is, inﬂation
targeting is not only about stabilizing inﬂation around the inﬂation target. Inﬂation targeting is in
practice always ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, in the sense that there is also weight on stabilizing the
real economy. Second, real-world inﬂation targeting is not that the policy rate responds only to
current inﬂation, with an instrument rule such as  = ( − ∗) or  − −1 = ( − ∗),w h e r e
 is the policy rate in period  and  is a positive constant. Inﬂation targeting instead implies
that the policy rate responds to much more than current inﬂation, namely to all information that
aﬀects the forecast of inﬂation and the real economy. Thus, a theory of inﬂation targeting cannot
start from such a loss function or such an instrument rule.
3.1. A linear-quadratic model of optimal monetary policy

















Here,  is an -vector of predetermined variables in period  (where the period is typically a
quarter);  is an -vector of forward-looking variables;  is generally an -vector of (policy)
a policy-rate path so that the resulting forecast of inﬂation and the real economy “looks good,” they may not agree
on the precise criteria for what “looks good” means, for instance, that this can assessed with an explicit quadratic
loss function.
17 Some misunderstandings were aired at the ECB conference “Key Developments in Monetary Economics” where
a preliminary version of this chapter was presented.
18 The linear model can be derived as the standard loglinearization of a nonlinear DSGE model. For monetary
policy, the changes in variables are usually no more than a few percent, so the assumptions underlying the linearization
a r el i k e l yt ob ef u l ﬁlled. Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Svensson (2009) shows in detail how the Riksbank’s operational
DSGE model, Ramses, can be written in this form.
15instruments but in most cases there is only one policy instrument, the policy rate, so  =1 ;
 is an -vector of i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix ; , ,a n d,a n d
 are matrices of the appropriate dimension; and, for the stochastic process of any variable ,
+| denotes E+, the rational expectation of the realization of + in period + conditional
on information available in period . The forward-looking variables and the instruments are the
nonpredetermined variables.19
The variables can be measured as diﬀerences from steady-state values, in which case their
unconditional means are zero. Alternatively, one of the components of  can be unity, so as to
allow the variables to have nonzero means. The elements of the matrices , , ,a n d are in
practice often estimated with Bayesian methods and their point estimates are then assumed ﬁxed
and known for the policy simulations. Then the conditions for certainty equivalence are satisﬁed.
The upper block of (3.1) provides  equations determining the -vector +1 in period +1
for given , , ,a n d+1
+1 = 11 + 12 + 1 + +1 (3.2)












The lower block provides  equations determining  in period  for given +1|, ,a n d
 = −1
22 (+1| − 21 − 2) (3.4)
We hence assume that the  × submatrix 22 is nonsingular. In particular, the matrix  need
not be singular.20 21
19 A variable is predetermined if its one-period-ahead prediction error is an exogenous stochastic process (Klein
(2000)). Hence, the non-predetermined variables have one-period-ahead prediction errors that are endogenous. For
(3.1), the one-period-ahead prediction error of the predetermined variables is the stochastic vector +1.
20 Without loss of generality, we assume that the shocks  only enter in the upper block of (3.1), since any shocks
in the lower block of (3.1) can be redeﬁned as additional predetermined variables and introduced in the upper block.
21 In a backward-looking model, a model such as the one of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), there are no forward-
looking variables. That is, there is no vector  of forward-looking variables, no lower block of equations in (3.1),
and the vector of target variables  only depends on the vector of predetermined variables  and the (vector of)
instrument(s) .
16As an example, we can take a standard New Keynesian model,
 − ∗ = (+1| − ∗)+( − ¯ )+ (3.5)
 − ¯  =( +1| − ¯ +1|) − ( − +1| − ¯ ) (3.6)
+1 =  + +1 (3.7)




(¯  + +1) (3.9)
Equation (3.5) is the Phillips curve (aggregate-supply relation), where  denotes inﬂation, ∗ is
the inﬂation target,  is a discount factor,  denotes output, ¯  denotes potential output,  − ¯ 
is the output gap, and  is a so-called cost-push shock.22 Equation (3.6) is the aggregate-demand
relation, where  denotes the policy rate and ¯  the neutral real rate. Equations (3.7)-(3.9) give





(¯ +1| − ¯ )
This equation is satisﬁed by (3.8) and (3.9). The vector of predetermined variables is  ≡
( ¯  ¯ )0, and the vector of forward-looking variables is  ≡ ( ). This example is special
in that all predetermined variables are exogenous variables and there are no endogenous predeter-
mined variables. It is straightforward to rewrite the equations (3.5)-(3.9) on the form (3.1) and
thereby identify the matrices , , ,a n d.
Let  be an  -vector of target variables, measured as the gap to an  -vector  ∗ of target
levels. This is not restrictive, as long as we keep the target levels time invariant. If we would like to
examine the consequences of diﬀerent target levels, we can instead let  refer to the absolute level
of the target variables and replace  by  −  ∗ everywhere below. We assume that the target

















where  is an  × ( +  + ) matrix and partitioned conformably with , ,a n d.23
22 Calvo-style price setters that are not reoptimizing prices are assumed to index prices to the inﬂation target.
23 For plotting and other purposes, and to avoid unnecessary separate program code, it is often convenient to
expand the vector  to include a number of variables of interest that are not necessary target variables or potential
target variables. These will then have zero weight in the loss function.






where 0 1 denotes a discount factor,  denotes the period loss and is given by
 ≡  0
Λ (3.12)
and Λ is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix containing the weights on the individual target
variables.
As an example, under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting with no interest-rate smoothing, the period
loss function can be written as the standard quadratic loss function,
 =(  − ∗)2 + ( − ¯ )2 (3.13)
where ∗ denotes the inﬂation target, the output gap is used as a measure of resource utilization
around a normal level, and the relative weight on output-gap stabilization, , is positive under
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. The target variables are here the inﬂation gap, −∗, the gap between
inﬂation and the inﬂation target ∗, and the output gap,  − ¯ , the gap between output and
potential output, so the vector of target variables satisﬁes  ≡ (−∗ − ¯ )0. Then the matrix
Λ is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal (1).
The optimization is here under the assumption that commitment in a timeless perspective is
possible. The case of optimization under discretion is discussed in section 3.8.24 The optimization
results in a set of ﬁrst-order conditions which, combined with the model equations (3.1), results in a
system of diﬀerence equations (see Söderlind (1999) and Svensson (2009b)). The system of diﬀerence
equations can be solved with several alternative algorithms, for instance, those developed by Klein
(2000) and Sims (2002) (see Svensson (2005) and Svensson (2009b) for details of the derivation and
application of the Klein algorithm).25
Under the assumption of optimization under commitment in a timeless perspective, the solution
24 See Woodford (2010b) for a detailed discussion of optimization under commitment, commitment in a timeless
perspective, and discretion.
25 The system of diﬀerence equations can also be solved with the so-called AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore
(1983) and Anderson and Moore (1985) (see Anderson (2010) for a recent formulation). Whereas the Klein algorithm
is easy to apply directly to the system of diﬀerence equations, the AIM algorithm requires some rewriting of the
diﬀerence equations. Previously, the AIM algorithm have appeared to be signiﬁcantly faster for large systems (see
Anderson (2000) for a comparison between AIM and other algorithms), but a new Matlab function, ordqz, makes the
Klein algorithm much faster. The appendix of Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Svensson (2009) discusses the relation
between the Klein and AIM algorithms and shows how the system of diﬀerence equations can be rewritten to ﬁtt h e
AIM algorithm.








































for  ≥ 0,w h e r e





and 0 and Ξ−1 are given. The Klein algorithm returns the matrices  and . The submatrix 







The matrices  and  depend on , , , , Λ,a n d, but they are independent of .T h a t
they are independent of  demonstrates certainty equivalence (the certainty equivalence that holds
when the model is linear, the loss function is quadratic, and the shocks and the uncertainty are
additive); only probability means of current and future variables are needed to determine optimal
policy (and the optimal projections to be discussed in section 3.3). The -vector Ξ−1 consists of
the Lagrange multipliers of the lower block of (3.20), the block determining the projection of the
forward-looking variables.26
Instead of a solution under optimal policy, we can consider a solution under a given arbitrary












for  ≥ 0,w h e r et h e × ( + ) matrix  ≡ [ ] is a given (linear) instrument rule and
partitioned conformably with  and .I f ≡ 0, the instrument rule is an explicit instrument
rule; if  6=0 , the instrument rule is an implicit instrument rule. In the latter case, the instrument
rule is actually an equilibrium condition, in the sense that the policy rate in period  and the
forward-looking variables in period  are then simultaneously determined.27
If the instrument rule is combined with (3.1), the resulting system of diﬀerence equations can
be solved for a solution (3.14)-(3.16), except that there is no vector of Lagrange multipliers Ξ.I n
that case the matrices  and  depend on , ,  and , but not on .
26 Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Svensson (2009) discusses how the initial value for Ξ−1 can be chosen.
27 See Svensson (2003b) and Svensson and Woodford (2005) for more discussion of explicit and implicit instrument
rules.
19The model (3.1) can also be solved for a given targeting rule, a linear combination of leads and






where  denotes the largest lag,  denotes the largest lead in the targeting rule, and  for  =
−−+1are × matrices (we need as many rows in (3.19) as the number of instruments).
As shown by Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2010), the ﬁrst-order
conditions for an optimum can be written in the form (3.19) after elimination of the Lagrange
multipliers. Targeting rules are further discussed in section 3.6.
How could optimal policy or policy with a given instrument rule be implemented? The standard
theory of optimal monetary policy is not very explicit on this point. One interpretation of the above
analysis would be that the central bank once and for all calculates the optimal instrument rule 
in (3.17), alternatively picks a given instrument rule  in (3.18), and then publishes the instrument
rule and makes a public commitment to use it to set its policy rate forever. The private sector then
believes in the commitment to the instrument rule, combines it with the model in (3.1), calculates
the corresponding rational-expectations equilibrium, and makes its decisions accordingly. The
resulting equilibrium is then the equilibrium described by the equations (3.14)-(3.16) (for the given
instrument rule (3.18), without the Lagrange multipliers).
However, this is not the way monetary policy is implemented by any real-word central bank. No
central bank announces a speciﬁc instrument rule and commits to follow it forever. For one thing,
the optimal instrument rule would depend on a long list of predetermined variables (not to speak
of the Lagrange multipliers), and the optimal instrument rule would be much too complicated to
be communicated. Any simple given instrument rule, such as a Taylor rule, would be too simple
and imperfect for the central bank to stick with it (see Svensson (2003b)).
In the real world, an inﬂation-targeting central bank instead announces the current level of the
policy rate, gives some indication of future policy rates or even publishes a full policy-rate forecast,
and usually also publishes a forecast of inﬂation and the real economy. The private sector then
responds to this information, and the actual equilibrium results. This is the kind of monetary
policy and its implementation that I try to model next. In particular, forecasts and projections of
the policy rate, inﬂation, and the real economy take center stage.
203.2. The projection model and the feasible set of projections
Let  ≡ {+}∞
=0 denote a projection (a conditional mean forecast) in period  for any vector of
variables ,w h e r e+ denotes the mean forecast of the realization of the vector in period  +
conditional on information available in period . We refer to  as the horizon of the forecast +.
The projection model for the projections (  ) in period  uses that the projection of the



















for  ≥ 0,w h e r e
 = | (3.22)
where | is the estimate of predetermined variables in period  conditional on information available
in the beginning of period . The introduction of this notation here allows the realistic possibility
that the central bank has imperfect information about the current state of the economy and, for
instance, as in Svensson and Woodford (2005) estimates the current state of the economy with the
help of a Kalman ﬁlter, a case that is further discussed in section 3.9.1. Thus, “”a n d“ |”i n
subindices refer to projections (forecasting) and estimates (“nowcasting” and “backcasting”) in the
beginning of period , respectively. The feasible set of projections for given |, denoted T (|),
is the set of projections (  ) that satisfy (3.20)-(3.22). We call T (|) the set of feasible
projections in period . It is conditional on the estimates of the matrices , , ,a n d and the
estimate of the current realization of the predetermined variables |.
3.3. Optimal policy choice
The policy problem in period  is to determine the optimal projection in period .T h e o p t i m a l





where the period forecast loss, +, is speciﬁed as
+ = +
0Λ+ (3.24)
21for  ≥ 0. The minimization is subject to the projection being in the feasible set of projections for
given |, T (|).28
For the standard quadratic loss function (3.13), the corresponding period forecast loss function
is
+ =( +− ∗)2 + (+− ¯ +)2 (3.25)
where + and +− ¯ + are the forecast in period  of inﬂation and the output gap, respec-
tively, in period  + .
When the policy problem is formulated in terms of projections, we can allow 0 ≤ 1,s i n c e
the above inﬁnite sum in (3.23) will normally converge also for  =1 . Again, the optimization is
done under commitment in a timeless perspective (Woodford (2003), Woodford (2010b)).
The intertemporal loss function (3.23) with the period forecast loss function (3.24) introduces
a preference ordering over projections of the target variables,  . We can express this preference













−1( − −1) (3.26)
where the modiﬁcation is the added term 1
Ξ0
−1( − −1).I nt h a tt e r m ,Ξ−1 is as mentioned
the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the equations for the forward-looking variables from the
optimization problem in period −1,  is the projection of the vector of forward-looking variables
in period  that satisﬁes the projection model (3.20) and the initial condition (3.22), and −1 is
the optimal projection in period −1 of the vector of forward-looking variables in period  (−1 is
predetermined in period  and normalizes the added term and makes it zero in case the projection
 coincides with the projection −1 but does not aﬀect the choice of optimal policy). As
discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2005), the added term and the dependence on the Lagrange
multiplier Ξ−1 ensure that the minimization of (3.26), under either discretion or commitment,
results in the optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective.29
The optimal policy choice, which results in the optimal policy projection, can now be formal-
ized as choosing   in the set of feasible projections in period  so as to minimize the modiﬁed





0 + in (3.11), results in the same optimal instrument rule in period  as the minimiza-









The expected value of discounted future losses will exceed the intertemporal forecast loss function by the term ∞
=0 
 [E(+ − E+)
0(+ − E+)] due to the forecast errors + − E+, but the eﬀect of policy on
those forecasts errors and that term can be disregarded under certainty equivalence.
29 This added term is closely related to the recursive saddlepoint method of Marcet and Marimon (1998), see
Svensson (2009b) and Woodford (2010b) for more discussion.





−1( − −1) subject to (  ) ∈ T (|) (3.27)
The set of feasible projections T (|) is obviously very large and contains inﬁnitely many
diﬀerent policy projections. The presentation of the alternative policy projections generated by
alternative policy-rate paths (for instance, as described in Laséen and Svensson (2010)), can be
seen as an attempt to narrow down the set of inﬁnite alternative feasible policy projections to a
ﬁnite number of alternatives for the policymaker to choose between.
For a given linear projection model and a given modiﬁed quadratic intertemporal loss function,
it is possible to compute the optimal policy projection exactly. By varying the parameters of
the modiﬁed intertemporal loss function it is possible to generate alternative policy projections.
Generating alternative policy projections in that way has the advantage that the policy projections
are on the eﬃcient frontier, to be speciﬁed below. However, the policymaker may still prefer to see
a few representative alternative policy projections constructed with alternative policy-rate paths
that are not constructed as optimal policy projections. The methods to construct policy projections
for alternative anticipated policy-rate paths presented in Laséen and Svensson (2010) is one way
to do this.
As discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003), commitment







instead of adding the extra term to the period loss function. Let T (|Ξ−1) denote the subset of
the feasible set of projections that satisfy (3.28) for given | and Ξ−1 and call this the restricted
feasible set of projections. Then the optimal policy projection is also the solution to the problem
minimize L( ) subject to (  ) ∈ T (|Ξ−1) (3.29)
3.4. The forecast Taylor curve
The optimal policy projection, the restricted set of feasible projections, and the eﬃcient restricted
set of projections can be illustrated using a modiﬁed Taylor curve, a forecast Taylor curve. Whereas
the original Taylor curve involves unconditional variances (to be precise, standard deviations in
ﬁgure 1 of Taylor (1979)) of ex post outcomes, the forecast Taylor curve involves the discounted
sum of squared inﬂation-gap and output-gap forecasts ex ante (see Svensson (2010a) for applications
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of forecast Taylor curves to policy evaluation). With the loss function (3.25), the intertemporal








Let us call the discounted sums
P∞
=0 (+ − ∗)2 and
P∞
=0 (+ − ¯ +)2 the sum of
squared inﬂation gaps and output gaps, respectively( k e e p i n gi nm i n dt h a tw ea c t u a l l ym e a n
inﬂation-gap and output-gap forecasts). We can now illustrate the restricted set of feasible projec-
tions, T (|Ξ−1), in the space of sum of squared inﬂation and output gaps. In ﬁgure 3.1, the
sum of squared inﬂation gaps is plotted along the horizontal axis and the sum of squared output
gaps is plotted along the vertical axis. The restricted set of feasible projections is the set on and
a b o v et h ec u r v et h r o u g ht h ep o i n tP .T h ee ﬃcient restricted set of feasible projections, the eﬃcient
frontier of the restricted set of feasible projections, is given by the boundary, the curve through the
point P.
In the ﬁgure, we can also illustrate isoloss lines of the intertemporal forecast loss function as
negatively sloped lines with the slope 1. An isoloss line closer to the origin corresponds to a
lower loss. The optimal policy projection is given by the tangency point P between the eﬃcient
frontier and an isoloss line, the policy projection in the restricted set of feasible projections that
gives the lowest intertemporal loss.
The eﬃcient frontier consists of the projections in the set of restricted feasible projections that
are eﬃcient, in the sense that there is no other projection in the restricted feasible set that has a
24lower sum of squared inﬂation gaps without having a higher sum of squared output gaps. Obviously,
the optimal policy projection is in the eﬃcient set.
Section 4.3 and 4.4 show applications of these ideas in practical policy.
3.5. Optimal policy projections
Under the assumption of optimization under commitment in a timeless perspective, the optimal


























for  ≥ 0,w h e r e ˆ  = | and Ξ−1 = Ξ−1. The matrices , ,a n d ˜  are the same as above.
Alternative optimal projections can be constructed by varying the weights in the matrix Λ
and the discount factor . The use of alternative optimal projections has the advantage that the
projections considered are eﬃcient in the sense of minimizing an intertemporal loss function. That
is, each projection is such that it is not possible to reduce the discounted sum of squared future
projected deviations of a target variable from its target level without increasing the discounted
sum of squared such future projected deviations of another target variable (this assumes that the
positive symmetric semideﬁnite matrix Λ is diagonal). In ﬁgure 3.1, the eﬃcient subset of the set of
feasible projections, the eﬃcient frontier of the set of feasible projections, is given by the negatively
sloped curve through the point P. There are obvious advantages to restricting policy choices to be
among eﬃcient alternatives. Projections constructed with an arbitrary instrument rule (or with
arbitrary deviations from an optimal instrument rule) are generally not eﬃcient in this sense. That
is, they correspond to points in the interior of the feasible set of projections, points north-east of
the curve through point P in ﬁgure 3.1.












The resulting projection will satisfy equations such as (3.30)-(3.32), although without any Lagrange
multipliers, where the matrices  and  depend on , ,  and . For arbitrary instrument rules,
the projections will not be eﬃcient.
253.6. Targeting rules
As discussed in Svensson (2003b) and Svensson (2005), the monetary-policy decision process makes
the current instrument-rate decision a very complex policy function of the large amounts of data
and judgment that have entered into the process. I believe that it is not very helpful to summarize
this policy function as a simple instrument rule such as a Taylor rule. Furthermore, the resulting
complex policy function is a reduced form, which depends on the central-bank objectives, its view
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and the judgment it has exercised. It is the
endogenous complex result of a complex process. In no way is this policy function structural,i nt h e
sense of being invariant to the central bank’s view of the transmission mechanism and private-sector
behavior, or the amount of information and judgmental adjustments. Still, much current literature
treats monetary policy as characterized by a given instrument rule that is essentially structural
and invariant to changes in the model of the economy. Realizing that the policy function is a
reduced form is a ﬁrst step in a sensible theory of monetary policy. But, fortunately, this complex
reduced-form policy function need not be made explicit. It is actually not needed in the modern
monetary-policy process.
There is a convenient, more robust representation of monetary policy, namely in the form
of a targeting rule, as discussed in some detail in Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson
(2003b) and earlier in more general terms in Svensson (1999a). An optimal targeting rule is a ﬁrst-
order condition for optimal monetary policy. It corresponds to the standard eﬃciency condition
of equality between the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of transformation
between the target variables, the former given by the monetary-policy loss function, the latter
given by the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. An optimal targeting rule is invariant to
everything else in the model, including additive judgment and the stochastic properties of additive
shocks. Thus, it is a compact and robust representation of monetary policy, much more robust than
the optimal policy function. A simple targeting rule can potentially be a practical representation
of robust monetary policy, a robust monetary policy that performs reasonably well under diﬀerent
circumstances. Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2010) provide general
derivations of optimal targeting rules/target criteria, and they are further discussed in Woodford
(2007), Woodford (2010a), and Woodford (2010b).30 31
30 Walsh (2004) shows a case of equivalence between targeting rules and robust control.
31 Previously, Bank of England and the Riksbank assumed a constant interest rate underlying its inﬂation forecasts,
with the implication that a constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecasts that overshoots (undershoots) the inﬂation target
at some horizon such as two years indicates that the policy rate needs to increased (decreased). This is a far-from-
optimal targeting rule that has now been abandoned, as discussed in section 4.2.




for  ≥ 0. In the simplest New Keynesian model with the Phillips curve (3.5) and the loss function




[(+− ¯ +) − (+−1 − ¯ +−1)] = 0 (3.33)
for  ≥ 0 (Svensson and Woodford (2005)).
Optimal targeting rules remain a practical way of representing optimal monetary policy in the
small models usually applied for academic monetary-policy analysis. However, for the larger and
higher-dimensional operational macromodels used by many central banks in constructing projec-
tions, the optimal targeting rule becomes more complex and arguably less practical as a represen-
tation of optimal monetary policy. Optimal policy projections, the projections corresponding to
optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective, can however easily be derived directly
with simple numerical methods, without reference to any optimal targeting rule. For practical opti-
mal monetary policy, policymakers actually need not know the optimal targeting rule. Even less do
they need to know any policy function. They only need to ponder the graphs of the projections of
the target variables that are generated in the policy process and choose the projections of the target
variables and the policy rate that look best relative to the central bank’s objectives, as illustrated
in section 4.3.
3.7. Implementation and equilibrium determination
The policy decision can be characterized by (ˆ  ˆ  ), the optimal projection of the policy rate and
the target variables. The policy decision also determines the Lagrange multipliers Ξ to be used in
the loss function and policy decision in period  +1 .
How can we model how the policy is implemented and how the (rational-expectations) equi-
librium is determined? The central bank announces (or somehow communicates) ˆ  and ˆ   (and
possibly more details of its optimal projection) and sets the current policy rate in line with the
policy-rate path,  =ˆ . Let us assume that the central-bank projections are credible and hence
believed by the private sector.
In particular, assume that private-sector expectations of next period’s forward-looking variables
are equal to the central bank’s forecast and are rational and equal to E+1. The forward-looking
27variables  and the target variables  in period  are then determined by Eq. (3.4), given 
and E+1,a n d( 3 . 1 0 ) ,g i v e n, ,a n d. The next period’s predetermined variables +1
are then determined next period by (3.2), given ,  and next period’s shocks +1.T h e nn e x t
period’s policy decision then determines ˆ +1 and ˆ  +1,g i v e n+1|+1 and Ξ+1 ≡ Ξ.T h i sw a y
a rational-expectations equilibrium is implemented.
Is the equilibrium determinate? As discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2005), this may require
an out-of-equilibrium commitment which may be explicit or implicit.32 That is, the central bank
commits to deviate from ˆ  if the economy deviates from the optimal projection.33 For instance, if
realized inﬂation  exceeds the inﬂation projection ˆ , the central-bank may set a higher policy
rate according to
 =ˆ  + ( − ˆ )
where 0. In the example discussed in Svensson and Woodford (2005), the Taylor Principle of
1 ensures determinacy. Another example of an out-of-equilibrium commitment in that example
is
 =ˆ  + { − ∗ +


[( − ¯ ) − (−1 − ¯ −1)]} (3.34)
where
 − ∗ +


[( − ¯ ) − (−1 − ¯ −1)] = 0
is the optimal targeting rule, the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy, in the standard New
Keynesian model with the Phillips curve (3.5) and the loss function (3.13). Here, the out-of-
equilibrium commitment (3.34) implies that any positive deviation from the optimal targeting rule
(in the sense of too high inﬂation or too high output) would result in a higher policy rate. A
suﬃciently high value of ,u s u a l l yn o tv e r yd i ﬀerent from unity, ensures determinacy.
Importantly, in this setup the object of choice of the central bank and what is communicated
to the private sector is , the policy-rate path, not the policy function,  (although there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the optimal policy-rate path and the optimal policy function).34
32 For instance, in the standard New Keynesian model, the predetermined variables are exogenous. If the central
bank implements policy by letting the policy rate respond to the predetermined variables only, the policy rate will
be exogenous. Then, by the arguments of Sargent and Wallace (1975), the equilibrium may be indeterminate.
33 In Svensson and Woodford (2005) the precise timing of t h e s eo p e r a t i o n si sm a d ee x p l i c i ts oa st oa v o i da n y
simultaneity problems.
34 There is a one-to-one correspondence between the optimal policy-rate path and the optimal policy function





0), but there is a
continuum of implicit instrument rules (for which the policy instrument responds also to forward-looking variables)
consistent with the optimal policy. For instance, the implicit instrument rule  =(  − ) ˜  +  is consistent
with the optimal policy for any value of the scalar , since in equilibrium  =  ˜ . However, the determinacy
properties (the eigenvalue conﬁguration) may of course depend on .
283.8. Optimization under discretion and the discretion equilibrium
The previous discussion is under the assumption that commitment in a timeless perspective is
possible. Under optimization under discretion, the central bank minimizes the intertemporal loss
function (3.11) in period , taking into account that it will reoptimize again in period  +1(and
that this reoptimization is anticipated by the private sector). Oudiz and Sachs (1985) derive an
iterative algorithm for the solution of this problem (with the unnecessary simpliﬁcation of  = ),
which is further discussed in Backus and Driﬃll (1986), Currie and Levine (1993), and Söderlind
(1999). This algorithm is brieﬂy described here.35
Since the loss function is quadratic and the constraints are linear, it follows that the solution
will be linear and the minimized intertemporal loss will be quadratic. Reoptimization in period
+1subject to (3.1) and given +1 will result in the policy rate +1, the forward-looking variables
+1, and the minimized intertemporal loss in period  +1satisfying
+1 = +1+1 (3.35)





+1+1+1 + +1 (3.37)
where the matrices +1, +1,a n d+1 and the scalar +1 are determined by the decision
problem in period  +1 . These matrices and the scalar are assumed to be known in period ;o n l y
+1 and +1 will matter for the decision problem in period .
By taking expectations of (3.36) and using (3.2), we have
+1| = +1+1| = +1(11 + 12 + 1) (3.38)
Using (3.38) in the lower block of (3.1) and solving for  results in
 = ¯  + ¯  (3.39)
where
¯  ≡ (22 − +112)−1(+111 − 21) (3.40)
¯  ≡ (22 − +112)−1(+11 − 2) (3.41)
( w ea s s u m et h a t22 − +112 is nonsingular). Using (3.39) in the upper block of (3.1) then
gives
+1 = ˜  + ˜  + +1 (3.42)
35 See Svensson (2009b) for more details of this algorithm.
29where
˜  ≡ 11 + 12 ¯  (3.43)
˜  ≡ 1 + 12 ¯  (3.44)
The optimization problem in period  is now to minimize
 + E(0
+1+1+1 + +1)
subject to (3.42). The problem has been transformed to a standard linear-quadratic regulator





 +  ≡  + E(0
+1+1+1 + +1)
where  and  must satisfy
 = ¯  + ¯  (3.45)
Equation (3.40)-(3.45) deﬁne a mapping from (+1 +1) to ( ), which also determines
. The solution to the problem is a ﬁxed point () of the mapping and a corresponding .
It can be obtained as the limit of ( ) when  →− ∞ .



















⎦ ≡ ˜ 
for  ≥ 0,w h e r e( ˜  ˜ ) is the limit of ( ˜  ˜ ) when  →−∞ . We note that, by (3.45),  and 
will satisfy
 = ¯  + ¯  (3.46)
where ( ¯  ¯ ) is the limit of ( ¯  ) when  →−∞ .
The matrices  and  depend on , , , , Λ,a n d, but they are independent of .T h i s
demonstrates the certainty equivalence of the discretionary equilibrium.
36 Svensson (2009b) provides details.
303.8.1. The projection model, the feasible set of projections, and the optimal policy
projection
Under discretion, the projection model for the projections (  ) can be written
++1 = ˜ ++ ˜ + (3.47)









for  ≥ 0,w h e r e
 = | (3.50)
The feasible set of projections for given |, T (|) is then the set of projections that satisfy
(3.47)-(3.50). The optimal policy projection is then the solution to the problem
minimize L( ) subject to (  ) ∈ T (|)
Policy under discretion is here modeled as assuming that in each period + ≥ , private-sector
expectations in period + of the forward-looking variables and the policy rate in period + +1,
++1| and ++1|, are determined by its belief that the central bank will reoptimize in period
 +  +1 .37 This means that the private-sector expectations of the forward-looking variables and





where ++1|+, the private-sector expectations in period + of the predetermined variables in
period  +  +1is given by
++1|+ = ˜ +|+ + ˜ +
In particular, private-sector expectations in period  of the forward-looking variables and the policy





= +1| = ( ˜ | + ˜ ) (3.51)
The central bank’s forecast in period  of the forward-looking variables in period  +1depends on
its forecast for both its policy rate in period  +1 , +1, according to
+1 = ¯ +1 + ¯ +1 = ¯ ( ˜ | + ˜ )+ ¯ +1
37 Recall that private-sector rational expectations are denoted by a vertical bar in the subindex  + |,w h e r e a s
central-bank projections are denoted by a comma in the subindex  + .
31If the central bank’s forecast of its policy rate is consistent with its reoptimization in period  +1 ,
it will satisfy
+1 = +1 = ( ˜ | + ˜ )
and be equal to the private-sector expectations of the policy rate, +1|. Then the central bank’s
forecast of the forward-looking variables, +1, will be equal to the private-sector expectations,
+1|,s i n c e
+1 = ¯ +1 + ¯ +1 = ¯ +1 + ¯ +1 = +1 = ( ˜ | + ˜ )=+1|
where we have used (3.46).
Thus, the speciﬁcation of the projection model under discretion, (3.47)-(3.50), implies that the
central bank considers alternative policy-rate paths and associated forecasts for the predetermined
and forward-looking variables, taking into account that those forecasts would not be credible and de-
viate from private-sector expectations. The private-sector expectations are here consistently equal
to the optimal policy projection under discretion. In contrast, the speciﬁcation of the projection
model under commitment, (3.20)-(3.22), implies that the central bank considers alternative policy-
rate paths and associated forecasts for the predetermined and forward-looking variables under the
assumption that these alternative forecasts are credible.
3.8.2. Degrees of commitment
Commitment and discretion raise intriguing issues. Which is the more realistic description of actual
monetary-policy decisions is not obvious. In Bergo (2007), the then Deputy Governor of Norges
Bank provides a fascinating discussion of how Norges Bank tries to implement optimal policy under
commitment. My own view so far has been that central-bank staﬀ should propose to policymakers
policy alternatives that are consistent with commitment in a timeless perspective, in the hope
that policymakers would restrict their choices to those alternatives. This is the view underlying
Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Svensson (2009), for instance. How diﬀerent the outcomes under
commitment and discretion will depend on many things and how relevant these diﬀerences are for
policymaking is an empirical issue that to my knowledge has not been resolved.38
A ni n t e r e s t i n gi d e ai st oc o n s i d e rn o to n l yt h e extremes of commitment and discretion but
also a continuum in between. Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) present a simple framework for
38 Furthermore, as discussed by Dennis (2008), the relative performance of commitment in a timeless perspective
and discretion is an intriguing issue and depends on circumstances and how policy performance is evaluated. See
Woodford (2010b) for more discussion of commitment, commitment in a timeless perspective, and discretion.
32analyzing monetary policy in such a continuum, what they call quasi-commitment, between the
extremes of commitment and discretion. Quasi-commitment is characterized by a given probability
of a central bank reneging from a commitment. That probability can be interpreted as a measure of
the lack of credibility of the central bank’s policy, and they examine the welfare eﬀects of a marginal
increase in credibility. The main ﬁnding in their simple framework is that most of the welfare gain
from increased commitment accrues at relatively low levels of credibility. The magnitude of the
welfare gain is smaller when there is less inﬂation bias under discretion, that is, less average excess
of inﬂation over the inﬂation target.
3.9. Uncertainty
In this subsection, I brieﬂy discuss two kinds of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about an im-
perfectly observed state of the economy and uncertainty about the model and the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
3.9.1. Uncertainty about the state of the economy
It is a truism that monetary policy operates under considerable uncertainty about the state of the
economy and the size and nature of the disturbances that hit the economy. This is a particular
problem for forecast targeting, under which the central bank, in order to set its interest-rate in-
strument, needs to construct conditional forecasts of future inﬂation, conditional on alternative
interest-rate paths and the bank’s best estimate of the current state of the economy and the likely
future development of important exogenous variables. Often, diﬀerent indicators provide conﬂicting
information on developments in the economy. In order to be successful, a central bank then needs
to put the appropriate weights on diﬀerent information and draw the most eﬃcient inference. In
the case of a purely backward-looking model (of the evolution of the bank’s target variables and the
indicators), the principles for eﬃcient estimation and signal extraction are well known. But in the
more realistic case where important indicator variables are forward-looking variables, the problem
of eﬃcient signal-extraction is inherently more complicated.
In the case where there are no forward-looking variables, it is well known that a linear model
with a quadratic loss function and a partially observable state of the economy (partial information)
is characterized by certainty equivalence. T h a ti s ,t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi st h es a m ea si ft h es t a t e
of the economy were fully observable (full information), except that one responds to an eﬃcient
estimate of the state vector rather than to its actual value. Furthermore, a separation principle
33applies, according to which the selection of the optimal policy (the optimization problem) and the
estimation of the current state of the economy (the estimation or signal-extraction problem) can be
treated as separate problems. In particular, the observable variables will be predetermined and the
innovations in the observable variables (the diﬀerence between the current realization and previous
prediction of each of the observable variables) contain all new information. The optimal weights to
be placed on the innovations in the various observable variables in one’s estimate of the state vector
at each point in time are provided by a standard Kalman ﬁlter (see, for instance, Chow (1973),
Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1975), and LeRoy and Waud (1977)).
The case without forward-looking variables is, however, very restrictive. In the real world,
many important indicator variables for central banks are forward-looking variables, variables that
depend on private-sector expectations of the future developments in the economy and future policy.
Central banks routinely watch variables that are inherently forward-looking, like exchange rates,
bond rates and other asset prices, as well as measures of private-sector inﬂation expectations,
industry order-ﬂows, conﬁdence measures, and the like. Forward-looking variables complicate the
estimation or signal-extraction problem signiﬁcantly. They depend, by deﬁnition, on private-sector
expectations of future endogenous variables and of current and future policy actions. However,
these expectations in turn depend on an estimate of the current state of the economy, and that
estimate in turn depends, to some extent, on observations of the current forward-looking variables.
This circularity presents a considerable challenge for the estimation problem in the presence of
forward-looking variables. Pearlman, Currie, and Levine (1986) showed in a linear (non-optimizing)
model with forward-looking variables and partial symmetric information that the solution can be
expressed in terms of a Kalman ﬁlter, although the solution is much more complex than in the
purely backward-looking case. Pearlman (1992) later used this solution in an optimizing model to
demonstrate that certainty equivalence and the separation principle apply under both discretion
and commitment in the presence of forward-looking variables and symmetric partial information.
Svensson and Woodford (2003) extended this previous work on partial information with forward-
looking variables by providing simpler derivations of the optimal weights on the observable variables,
and clarifying how the updating equations can be modiﬁed to handle the circularity mentioned
above.39 They also provided a simple example, in the standard New Keynesian model, that clariﬁes
several issues raised by Orphanides (2003). He has argued, for instance, with reference to real-time
39 Gerali and Lippi (2008) provide a toolkit of Matlab routines that applies the algorithms of Svensson and Woodford
(2005).
34U.S. data from the 1970s, that it is better that monetary policy disregards uncertain data about the
output gap and responds to current inﬂation only. The ﬁndings in Svensson and Woodford (2003)
are diﬀerent and in line with the conventional wisdom. First, they found that the monetary-policy
response to the optimal estimates of the current output gap is the same as under certainty, that
is, that certainty equivalence applies. Second, the optimal weights put on the noisy observations,
the indicators, used in constructing the optimal estimate of the output gap depends on the degree
of uncertainty. For instance, when the degree of noise in an indicator of potential output is large,
the optimal weight on that indicator becomes small.40
3.9.2. Uncertainty about the model and the transmission mechanism
Recognizing the uncertain environment that policymakers face, recent research has considered
broader forms of uncertainty for which certainty equivalence no longer applies. While this may
have important implications, in practice the design of policy becomes much more diﬃcult outside
the classical linear-quadratic framework.
One of the conclusions of the Onatski and Williams (2003) study of model uncertainty is that,
for progress to be made, the structure of the model uncertainty has to be explicitly modeled. In
line with this, Svensson and Williams (2007b) develop a very explicit but still relatively general
form of model uncertainty that remains quite tractable. They use a so-called Markov jump-linear-
quadratic (MJLQ) model, where model uncertainty takes the form of diﬀerent “modes” (or regimes)
that follow a Markov process. The approach allows the user to move beyond the classical linear-
quadratic world with additive shocks, yet remains close enough to the linear-quadratic framework
that the analysis is transparent. Optimal and other monetary policies are examined in an extended
linear-quadratic setup, extended in a way to capture model uncertainty. The forms of model uncer-
tainty the framework encompasses include: simple i.i.d. model deviations; serially correlated model
deviations; estimable regime-switching models; more complex structural uncertainty about very
diﬀerent models, for instance, backward- and forward-looking models; time-varying central-bank
judgment–information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a particular model (Svensson
(2005))–about the state of model uncertainty; and so forth. Moreover, the methods also apply
to other linear models with changes of regime which may capture boom/bust cycles, productiv-
ity slowdowns and accelerations, switches in monetary and/or ﬁscal policy regimes, and so forth.
40 Svensson and Woodford (2004) derive an equlibrium with optimal monetary policy in a general linear-quadratic
model with asymmetric information, where then central bank has less information than the private sector. Aoki
(2006) provides an application to the standard New Keynesian model with a particular assumption about the central
bank’s information set. See Woodford (2010b) for more discussion of the case of asymmetric information.
35With algorithms for ﬁnding the optimal policy as well as solutions for arbitrary policy functions
it is possible to compute and plot consistent distribution forecasts–fan charts–of target variables
and instruments. The methods hence extend certainty equivalence and “mean forecast targeting,”
where only the mean of future variables matter (Svensson (2005)), to more general certainty non-
equivalence and “distribution forecast targeting,” where the whole probability distribution of future
variables matter (Svensson (2003b)).
Certain aspects of the MJLQ approach have been known in economics since the classic works
of Aoki (1967) and Chow (1973), who allowed for multiplicative uncertainty in a linear-quadratic
framework. The insight of those papers, when adapted to the MJLQ setting, is that in MJLQ
models the value function for the optimal policy design problem remains quadratic in the state, but
now with weights that depend on the mode. MJLQ models have also been widely studied in the
control-theory literature for the special case when there are no forward-looking variables (see Costa
and Fragoso (1995), Costa, Fragoso, and Marques (2005), do Val, Geromel, and Costa (1998), and
the references therein). More recently, Zampolli (2006) uses an MJLQ model to examine monetary
policy under shifts between regimes with and without an asset-market bubble, although still in a
model without forward-looking variables. Blake and Zampolli (2005) provide an extension of the
MJLQ model to include forward-looking variables,a l t h o u g hw i t hl e s sg e n e r a l i t yt h a ni nS v e n s s o n
and Williams (2007b) and with the analysis and the algorithms restricted to observable modes and
discretion equilibria.
The MJLQ approach is also closely related to the Markov regime-switching models which have
been widely used in empirical work. These methods ﬁrst gained prominence with Hamilton (1989)
which started a burgeoning line of research. Models of this type have been used to study a host
of empirical phenomena, with many developments and techniques summarized in Kim and Nelson
(1999). More recently, the implications of Markov switching in rational expectations models of
monetary policy have been studied by Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2009). These papers focus on (and debate) the conditions for uniqueness or indeterminacy of
equilibria in forward-looking models, taking as given a speciﬁed policy rule.
Relative to this previous literature, Svensson and Williams (2007b) provides a more general ap-
proach for solving for the optimal policy in MJLQ models that include forward-looking variables.
This extension is key for policy analysis under rational expectations, but the forward-looking vari-
ables make the model nonrecursive. The recursive saddlepoint method of Marcet and Marimon
(1998) can then be applied to express the model in a convenient recursive way, and an algorithm
36for determining the optimal policy and value functions can be derived.
The more general case where modes are unobservable and decision makers infer from their ob-
servations the probability of being in a particular mode is much more diﬃcult to solve. The optimal
ﬁlter is nonlinear, which destroys the tractability of the MJLQ approach.41 Additionally, as in most
Bayesian learning problems, the optimal policy will also include an experimentation component.
Thus, solving for the optimal decision rules will be a more complex numerical task. Due to the
curse of dimensionality, it is only feasible in models with a relatively small number of state vari-
ables and modes. Confronted with these diﬃculties, the literature has focused on approximations
such as linearization or adaptive control.42 Svensson and Williams (2007a) develops algorithms to
solve numerically for the optimal policy in these cases.43 D u et ot h ec u r s eo fd i m e n s i o n a l i t y ,t h e
Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) is only feasible in relatively small models. Confronted with these
diﬃculties, Svensson and Williams (2007a) also considers adaptive optimal policy (AOP).44 In this
case, the policymaker in each period does update the probability distribution of the current mode
in a Bayesian way, but the optimal policy is computed each period under the assumption that the
policymaker will not learn in the future from observations. In the MJLQ setting, the AOP is signif-
icantly easier to compute, and in many cases provides a good approximation to the BOP. Moreover,
the AOP analysis is of some interest in its own right, as it is closely related to speciﬁcations of
adaptive learning which have been widely studied in macroeconomics (see Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) for an overview). Further, the AOP speciﬁcation rules out the experimentation which some
may view as objectionable in a policy context.
41 The optimal nonlinear ﬁlter is well-known, and it is a key component of the estimation methods as well (Hamilton
(1989) and Kim and Nelson (1999)).
42 In the ﬁrst case, restricting attention to (sub-optimal) linear ﬁlters preserves the tractability of the linear-
quadratic framework. See Costa, Fragoso, and Marques (2005) for a brief discussion and references. In adaptive
control, agents do not take into account the informational role of their decisions. See do Val, Geromel, and Costa
(1998) for an application of an adaptive control MJLQ problem in economics. In a diﬀerent setting, Cogley, Colacito,
and Sargent (2007) have recently studied how well adaptive procedures approximate the optimal policies.
43 In addition to the classic literature (on such problems as a monopolist learning its demand curve), Wieland
(2000), Wieland (2006) and Beck and Wieland (2002) have recently examined Bayesian optimal policy and optimal
experimentation in a context similar to ours but without forward-looking variables. Eijﬃnger, Schaling, and Tesfase-
lassie (2006) examine passive and active learning in a simple model with a forward-looking element in the form of
a long interest rate in the aggregate-demand equation. Ellison and Valla (2001) and Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent
(2007) study situations like ours but where the expectational component is as in the Lucas-supply curve (−1,
f o re x a m p l e )r a t h e rt h a no u rf o r w a r d - l o o k i n gc a s e( +1, for example). Ellison (2006) analyzes active and passive
learning in a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve.
44 Optimal policy under no learning, adaptive optimal policy, and Bayesian optimal policy have in the literature
also been referred to as myopia, passive learning, and active learning, respectively.
373.10. Judgment
Throughout the monetary-policy decision process in central banks, a considerable amount of judg-
ment is applied to assumptions and projections. Projections and monetary-policy decisions cannot
rely on models and simple observable data alone. All models are drastic simpliﬁcations of the
economy, and data give a very imperfect view of the state of the economy. Therefore, judgmental
adjustments in both the use of models and the interpretation of their results–adjustments due to
information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of any particular model–are a necessary and
essential component in modern monetary policy. Any existing model is always an approximation of
the true model of the economy, and monetary-policy makers always ﬁnd it necessary to make some
judgmental adjustments to the results of any given model. Such judgmental adjustments could refer
to future ﬁscal policy, productivity, consumption, investment, international trade, foreign-exchange
and other risk premia, raw-material prices, private-sector expectations, and so forth.
One way to represent central-bank judgment is as the central-bank’s conditional mean estimate
of arbitrary multidimensional stochastic “deviations”–“add factors”–to the model equations, as
in Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) and Svensson (2005). The deviations represent
additional determinants–determinants outside the model–of the variables in the economy, the
diﬀerence between the actual value of a variable and the value predicted by the model. It can
be interpreted as model perturbations, as in the literature on robust control.45 Svensson (2005)
discusses optimal monetary policy, taking judgment into account, in backward- and forward-looking
models. Svensson and Tetlow (2005) show how central-bank judgment can be extracted according
to the method of Optimal Policy Projections (OPP). This method provides advice on optimal
monetary policy while taking policymakers’ judgment into account. Svensson and Tetlow (2005)
demonstrate the usefulness of OPP with a few example projections for two Greenbook forecasts
and the FRB/US model. An early version of the method was developed by Robert Tetlow for a
mostly backward-looking variant of the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model. The resulting
projections have been referred to at the Federal Reserve Board as “policymaker perfect-foresight
projections”–somewhat misleadingly. A description and application of the method is given in
Federal Reserve Board (2002), the Federal Reserve Board’s Bluebook for the FOMC meeting on
May 2, 2002.
Section 4.3 gives another example of the application of judgment, from the Riksbank’s policy
45 See, for instance, Hansen and Sargent (2008). However, that literature deals with the more complex case when
the model perturbations are endogenous and chosen by nature to correspond to a worst-case scenario.
38decision on February 2009. In the middle of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and rapidly deteriorating
economic situation, the Riksbank posted forecasts quite diﬀerent from the forecasts generated by
the Riksbank’s models.
4. Practice
In this section on the practice of inﬂation targeting, I ﬁrst discuss some development of practical
inﬂation targeting since its introduction in New Zealand in 1990. Then I make some brief comments
on the publication of policy-rate paths and describe the recent practice of two inﬂation-targeting
central banks that I know more about; the Riksbank, which is ranked as one of the world’s most
transparent central banks, and Norges Bank, which has been a pioneer in applying explicit optimal
monetary policy as an input in its policy decision. Finally I also comment on the issue of what
preconditions are appropriate for emerging-market economies that consider inﬂation targeting.
4.1. Some developments of inﬂation targeting
Inﬂation targeting was introduced in New Zealand in 1990.46 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand
was the ﬁrst central bank in the world to implement such a monetary policy setup, so it could not
r e l yo nt h ee x p e r i e n c eo fo t h e ri n ﬂation-targeting central banks. Likewise, it had little experience in
constructing inﬂation projections. During the 1990s, the Bank gradually established credibility and
anchored inﬂation expectations on the inﬂation target. The Bank also accumulated an increased
understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and increased conﬁdence in its
ability to fulﬁlt h ei n ﬂation target. This allowed the Bank some more degrees of freedom, and a
gradual move towards more ﬂexible and medium-term inﬂation targeting was to a large extent a
natural consequence. It is possible that a shorter horizon and somewhat higher weight on inﬂation
stabilization in the beginning may have contributed to establishing initial credibility.
Initially, the Bank had a rather rudimentary view of the transmission mechanism and mostly
emphasized the direct exchange rate channel to CPI inﬂation.47 The Bank also had a rather
short policy horizon of 2—4 quarters within which it would attempt to meet the inﬂation target
(see the Bank’s Brieﬁng of October 1996, Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1996)). The Bank’s
view of the transmission mechanism evolved gradually over the years to emphasize other channels
46 See Svensson (2001) and, in particular, Singleton, Hawke, and Grimes (2006) for the developments of inﬂation
targeting in New Zealand.
47 See Svensson (2000) and Svensson (2001) for a discussion of the channels of the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy.
39of transmission, especially the aggregate-demand channel. The Monetary Policy Statement of
December 1995, for instance, contains a box with a brief and preliminary discussion of the concept
of potential output, which is so central in modern views of the transmission mechanism. With the
introduction of the Forecasting and Policy System (FPS) in 1997 (Black, Cassino, Drew, Hansen
et al. (1997)), which built on Bank of Canada’s then state-of-the-art Quarterly Projection Model
(QPM) (Poloz, Rose, and Tetlow (1994)), the Bank had developed a fully-ﬂedged modern view of
the transmission mechanism in an open economy in line with best international practice. With the
introduction of the FPS, the Bank started to publish an interest-rate forecast in 1997, much earlier
than any other inﬂation-targeting central bank.
Parallel to these developments, the Bank lengthened its policy horizon and took a more ﬂexible
interpretation of the inﬂation target. Indeed, in its Brieﬁng of November 1999, Reserve Bank of
New Zealand (1999), the Bank completely subscribes to the idea of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting:
“Our conclusion, on the whole, has been to adopt a more medium-term approach,
which attaches more weight to the desirability of stabilising output, interest rates and
the exchange rate, while still aiming to keep inﬂation within the target range.”
The Bank mentioned some steps taken in this direction that include:
• “The widening of the inﬂation target range, from 0 to 2 percent to 0 to 3 percent...”
• “A lengthening of the horizon at which policy responses to inﬂation pressures are directed,
f r o m6t o1 2m o n t h st os o m e t h i n gm o r el i k e1 2t o2 4m o n t h s .T h i sm e a n st h a t ,p r o v i d e dt h e
medium-term inﬂation outlook is in line with the target, near-term shifts in the price level
are more likely to be accepted without policy reaction.”
• “Some de-emphasis of the edges of the target range as hard and precise thresholds...”
• “The shift from an MCI target to a cash interest rate instrument for implementing monetary
policy. This change has lessened the need for frequent intervention in the ﬁnancial markets,
and has resulted in more interest rate stability.”48
48 From June 1997 to March 1999, the Reserve Bank used a so-called Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) both as
an indicator and as an instrument in implementing monetary policy. The real MCI was constructed by combining
the 90-day real interest rate with the real exchange rate (expressed in terms of a trade-weighted index, the TWI),
with a weight of 0.5 on the exchange rate. (Using the nominal interest rate and exchange rate results in the nominal
MCI.) The MCI was supposed to measure the overall stance of monetary policy: the degree to which monetary policy
is deemed to resist either inﬂationary or deﬂationary tendencies. However, from the complexity of the transmission
mechanism, with diﬀerent channels, diﬀerent lags and diﬀerent strengths of the eﬀects, it is apparent that a simple
summary index like the MCI will be unreliable. For instance, the relative eﬀect of interest rate and exchange rate
40Regarding the policy horizon, inﬂation targeting has sometimes been associated with a ﬁxed
horizon, such as two years, within which the inﬂation target should be achieved. However, as is
now generally understood, under optimal stabilization of inﬂation and the real economy there is
no such ﬁxed horizon at which inﬂation goes to target or resource utilization goes to normal. The
horizon at which the inﬂation forecast is close to the target and/or the resource-utilization forecast
is close to normal depends on the initial situation of the economy, the initial deviation of inﬂation
and resource utilization from target and normal and the nature and size of the estimated shocks
to the economy (Faust and Henderson (2004), Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006), Smets (2003)). In line
w i t ht h i s ,m a n yo re v e nm o s ti n ﬂation-targeting central banks have more or less ceased to refer to
a ﬁxed horizon and instead refer to the “medium term.”49
With the linear models of the transmission mechanism that are standard for central banks,
reasonable equilibrium and optimal paths for inﬂation and resource utilization approach the target
and a normal level asymptotically, including the case when the policy rate is an estimated empirical
function of observable variables. More precisely, the resulting equilibrium forecasts on period  of
such models for the inﬂation and output gaps in period  + , + − ∗ and + − ¯ +,
changes on output and inﬂation varies with the channel, the time horizon, and how persistent these changes are
expected to be by households and ﬁrms. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the relative weight on the exchange
rate, taken to be 0.5 by the Reserve Bank, is stable. In line with this, attempts to estimate the relative weights
have resulted in diﬀerent and very uncertain estimates. The numerous problems of the MCI are discussed in Stevens
(1998). In my review of monetary policy 1990-2000 in New Zealand (Svensson (2001)), one of my conclusions was that
the uncritical use of the MCI had contributed to too tight policy in 1997/98 during the Asian crisis. In March 1999,
the Reserve Bank abandoned this unusual way of implementing monetary policy and instead moved to a completely
conventional implementation, by setting the Oﬃcial Cash Rate (OCR).
With regard to the operational framework and how monetary policy was managed in pursuit of the inﬂation target,
my overall conclusion was that “the period (mid 1997 to March 1999) when the Reserve Bank used a Monetary
Conditions Index (MCI) to implement monetary policy represents a signiﬁcant deviation from best international
practice. This has now been remedied, and monetary policy in New Zealand is currently entirely consistent with the
best international practice of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, with a medium-term inﬂation target that avoids unnecessary
variability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate. Only some marginal improvements, mostly of a technical
nature, are recommended.”
49 The Policy Target Agreement for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2007)) states
that “the policy target shall be to keep future CPI inﬂation outcomes between 1 and 3 per cent on average over the
medium term.” The Bank of England (Bank of England (2007)) states that “the MPC’s aim is to set interest rates
so that inﬂation can be brought back to target within a reasonable time period without creating undue instability in
the economy.” The Reserve Bank of Australia states (Reserve Bank of Australia (2008)) “[m]onetary policy aims to
achieve this [a target for consumer price inﬂation of 2-3 per cent per annum] over the medium term.” Norges Bank
states in its Monetary Policy Report that “Norges Bank sets the interest rate with a view to stabilising inﬂation
close to the target in the medium term.” In contrast, the Bank of Canada (Bank of Canada (2006)) mentions a more
speciﬁc target time horizon: “[T]he present policy of bringing inﬂation back to the 2 per cent target within six to eight
quarters (18 to 24 months) is still appropriate generally, although speciﬁc occasions may arise in which a somewhat
shorter or longer time horizon might be appropriate.” At the time of writing (March 2010) the Riksbank mostly uses
the phrase “in a couple of years,” but some documents (hopefully not for very long) still use the phrase “within two
years.”
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where  and  are constants determined by the initial state of the economy,  for  =1 
denote eigenvalues with modulus below unity, and  =0 1denotes the forecast horizon. This
means that the inﬂation-gap and the output-gap forecast for a particular forecast horizon are a
linear combination of terms that approach zero exponentially and asymptotically. There is hence
no particular horizon at which the forecast for the inﬂation or output gap is zero. Generally, a
lower (higher) relative weight () on output-gap stabilization implies that the inﬂation gap (the
output gap) goes to zero faster (slower) (Svensson (1997)). Furthermore, for any given horizon, the
size of the inﬂation or output gap depends on the initial inﬂation and output gap. Because of this,
half-time, meaning the horizon at which the gap has been reduced to a half of the initial gap, is a
more appropriate concept than a ﬁxed horizon for describing the convergence of the forecast to the
long-term mean values.50
4.2. Publishing an interest-rate path
As mentioned, inﬂation targeting is characterized by a high degree of transparency. Typically,
an inﬂation-targeting central bank publishes a regular monetary-policy report which includes the
bank’s forecast of inﬂation and other variables, a summary of its analysis behind the forecasts, and
the motivation for its policy decisions. Some inﬂation-targeting central banks also provide some
information on, or even forecasts of, its likely future policy decisions.
Indeed, a current much-debated issue concerning the further development of inﬂation targeting
is the appropriate assumption about the policy-rate path that underlies the forecasts of inﬂation
and other target variables and the information provided about future policy actions. Tradition-
ally, inﬂation-targeting central banks have assumed a constant interest rate underlying its inﬂation
forecasts, with the implication that a constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecast that overshoots (un-
dershoots) the inﬂation target at some horizon such as two years indicates that the policy rate needs
to increased (decreased) (Jansson and Vredin (2003), Vickers (1998)). Increasingly, central banks
have become aware of a number of serious problems with the assumption of constant interest rates.
50 A possible deﬁnition of half-time, , is the solution to the equation |1|
 =1 2,w h e r e1 is the eigenvalue
with the largest modulus, so  = −ln2 ln|1|.
42These problems include that the assumption may often be unrealistic and therefore imply biased
forecasts, imply either explosive or indeterminate behavior of standard models of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, and at closer scrutiny be shown to combine inconsistent inputs in
the forecasting process (such as some inputs such as asset prices that are conditional on market
expectations of future interest rates rather than constant interest rates) and therefore produce in-
consistent and diﬃcult-to-interpret forecasts (Leitemo (2003), Woodford (2005))). Some central
banks have moved to a policy-rate assumption equal to market expectations at some recent date
of future interest rates, as they can be extracted from the yield curve. This reduces the number
of problems mentioned above but does not eliminate them. For instance, the central bank may
have a view about the appropriate future interest-rate path that diﬀers from the market’s view.
A few central banks (notably the Reserve Bank of New Zealand already in 1997, Norges Bank in
2005, the Riksbank in 2007, and the Czech National Bank in 2008) have moved to deciding on and
announcing a policy-rate path; this approach solves all the above problems, is the most consistent
way of implementing inﬂation targeting, and provides the best information for the private sector.
The practice of deciding on and announcing optimal policy-rate paths is now likely to be gradu-
ally adopted by other central banks in other countries, in spite of being considered more or less
impossible, or even dangerous, only a few years ago (Svensson (2007), Woodford (2005), Woodford
(2007), Svensson (2009c)).51
4.3. The Riksbank
In January 1993, the Riksbank announced an inﬂation target of 2 percent for the CPI, with a
tolerance interval of ±1 percent, to apply from 1995. (The tolerance interval was considered
unnecessary and abolished in June 2010.) In 1999, the Riksbank became independent, and a
six-member executive board was appointed. The board members are individually accountable with
one vote each and the Governor has the tie-braking vote. There are normally six monetary-policy
meetings per year. After a meeting the policy decision and a Monetary Policy Report or Update
are released the next morning. Since February 2007, the Riksbank publishes not only a forecast
of inﬂation and the real economy but also a policy-rate path in its report/update. Minutes from
the policy meeting are published about two weeks after the meeting. Since June 2007, the minutes
are attributed. Since April 2009, the votes and any dissents are published in the press release the
51 Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz (2008) provide a theoretical analysis of transparency and opaqueness about the
central bank’s policy-rate path.
43Figure 4.1: Policy options for the Riksbank, July 2009
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day after the meeting and not only in the minutes two weeks later. The Riksbank ranks as one
of the most transparent central banks in the world (Dincer and Eichengreen (2009), Eijﬃnger and
Geraats (2006)).
The Riksbank has announced that it conducts ﬂexible inﬂation targeting and aims at stabilizing
both inﬂation around the inﬂation target and resource utilization around a normal level. Figure 4.1
shows some policy options for the Riksbank at the policy meeting in July 2009. Panel a shows three
alternative repo-rate paths (the repo rate is the Riksbank’s policy rate), named Main, Low, and
High. Panel c shows the corresponding forecasts for CPIF inﬂation (the CPI calculated with a ﬁxed
interest rate regarding housing costs) for the three repo-rate paths. Panel d shows corresponding
output-gap forecasts for the three repo-rate paths. Panel b, ﬁnally, shows the tradeoﬀ between
the mean squared gaps for the inﬂation- and output-gap forecasts. The mean squared gap for
the inﬂation- and output-gap forecast is the sum of the squared gaps over the forecast horizon
divided by the number of periods within the forecast horizon.52 The point marked Main shows,
for the Main repo-rate path, the mean squared gap for the inﬂation- and output-gap forecasts
along the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. The points marked Low and High show the
52 Mean squared gaps were introduced in Svensson (2010a). They appeared in the Riksbank’s Monetary Pol-
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44corresponding mean squared gaps for the Low and High repo-rate paths. The almost horizontal
line shows an isoloss line corresponding to equal weight on inﬂation and output-gap stabilization
( =1 ). (The line is almost horizontal because the scales of the axes are so diﬀerent.) We see
that the High repo-rate path is dominated by the Main and Low repo-rate path. The majority
of the board voted in favor of the Main alternative. Thanks to the high level of transparency of
the Riksbank, the attributed minutes from the meeting (available in English on the Riksbank’s
web page, www.riksbank.com) reveal a lively debate about the decision, including whether a zero
repo-rate was a feasible alternative or not. (I dissented in favor of the Low alternative.)
Figure 4.2 shows an example of how judgment is applied to result in a diﬀerent forecast than
the model one. The four panels a-d show the forecast of the repo-rate, CPIF, GDP growth, and
the output gap at the policy meeting in February 2009. The dash-dotted curves show the forecast
from the Riksbank’s DSGE model Ramses (Adolfson, Laseen, Lindé, and Villani (2007), Adolfson,
Laseen, Lindé, and Villani (2008)) when an estimated policy function is applied. The dashed curve
shows the forecast from the Riksbank’s Bayesian VAR model BVAR. The dotted curves, ﬁnally,
shows the Riksbank’s forecast of the four variables as presented in the Monetary Policy Report.
Taking into the account the severe ﬁnancial crisis and the rapidly deteriorating economic situation,
the Riksbank lowered the repo-rate by 100 basis points to 1 percent, much lower than the repo-rate
paths suggested by the models, and still had a more pessimistic view of GDP growth and the output
gap than the models.
4.4. Norges Bank
Norway adopted an inﬂation target of 2.5 percent for monetary policy in March 2001. Norges Bank
f o c u s e so na ni n d e xf o rc o r ei n ﬂation. It is explicit about being a ﬂexible inﬂation targeter and in
explaining what that means: “Norges Bank operates a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime, so that
weight is given to both variability in inﬂation and variability in output and employment” (Norges
Bank (2009)). Thus, Norges Bank can be seen as attempting to stabilize both the inﬂation gap
and the output gap, which is consistent with minimizing a conventional intertemporal quadratic
loss function.
The policy rate is set by the Bank’s executive board. Decisions concerning the policy rate
are normally taken at the executive board’s monetary-policy meeting every sixth week. At three
of these meetings, normally in March, June and October/November, Norges Bank publishes its
Monetary Policy Report with an explicit instrument-rate path and corresponding projections of
45Figure 4.2: The application of judgment by the Riksbank, February 2009.


















































CPI inﬂation, a measure of core inﬂation, the output gap, and the policy rate. The uncertainty
of the forecast is illustrated with probability distributions (uncertainty intervals), as in ﬁgure 4.3
from the policy meeting in January 2008 (Bank of England and the Riksbank, for instance, also
illustrate the uncertainty with the help of uncertainty intervals). The main scenario is the mean of
the probability distributions. It is normally assumed that the distribution is symmetric.
Oﬃcially, Norges Bank started to publish its own policy-rate forecast in the Inﬂation Report
of November 2005. However, already in the Inﬂation Report of March 2005, it published graphs
of alternative policy-rate paths and corresponding inﬂation and output-gap forecasts. These are
reproduced in ﬁgure 4.4, panels a, c, and d. In panel b, I have computed and plotted the corre-
sponding mean squared gaps for the three alternatives. The two negatively sloped lines show an
isoloss line for  =1and  =0 3 (the latter is the steeper line). The bank chose the Main alterna-
tive. Norges Bank is the only central bank that has announced that it applies a speciﬁc  when it
computes optimal policy in its macroeconomic model. Bergo (2007) and Holmsen, Qvigstad, and
Røisland (2007) report that optimal policy with  =0 3 has replicated policy projections published
by Norges Bank (with a discount factor of 099 and a weight on interest-rate smoothing of 02).
Disregarding interest-rate smoothing, panel b shows that the Main alternative is marginally better
then the High alternative for  =0 3






































































The decision process starts with the staﬀ producing optimal policy projections under commit-
ment.53 Although optimal policy projections with the medium-sized DSGE-model NEMO (Brubakk
and Sveen (2009)) is used as an input in the decision process, weight is also put on simple interest-
rate rules, such as the Taylor rule. Judgements are then added to the model-based projections.
The projections are then discussed by the board which might ask for additional adjustments based
on their judgments.
Norges Bank has also published a set of criteria that it uses when judging between diﬀerent
instrument-rate paths. The ﬁrst two criteria can be understood as verbal forms of optimality
conditions. The other three provide for interest-rate smoothing, robustness and cross-checking.
The criteria also work as an agenda for the internal discussions, see Holmsen, Qvigstad, Røisland,
and Solberg-Johansen (2008).
Like many other central banks, Norges Bank indicates how it will react should certain dis-
turbances occur by presenting alternative scenarios in the Monetary Policy Report.T h e e x a c t
speciﬁcation of the shocks in the illustrations diﬀers over time. The shifts are speciﬁed such that,
if shocks of the same type and size occur, the alternative instrument-rate path is the Bank’s best
estimate of how it would react in such a situation. The shifts are consistent with the main scenario
53 The staﬀ normally use commitment in a timeless perspective as the main normative benchmark, but they have
also considered alternatives such as the quasi-commitment in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) (see section 3.8.2).
47Figure 4.4: Policy options for Norges Bank, March 2005























































in the sense that they are based on the same loss function guiding the response of the central bank.
The Monetary Policy Report includes an account of the disturbances that have led to a change
in the instrument-rate forecast from the previous report. This “interest-rate account” is a model-
based illustration of how the change in the policy-rate forecast from the previous report can be
decomposed by diﬀerent exogenous shocks to the model. The illustration shows how changes in
the assessment of international and domestic economic variables as well as changes in the shock
processes have aﬀected the policy-rate path. The interest-rate account serves as a tool for commu-
nicating commitment. When the central bank commits to a reaction pattern under commitment,
a change in the instrument-rate forecast should reﬂect economic news and not re-optimization of
monetary policy. With an interest-rate account, the public is better able to check whether the
central bank responds to news only or whether it re-optimizes.
4.5. Preconditions for inﬂation targeting in emerging-market economies
An oft-heard objection to inﬂation targeting (at least before Batini and Laxton (2007)) is that it
is costly in terms of institutional and technical requirements, making the framework unsuitable for
some emerging-market economies. A detailed exposition of this point was made in Eichengreen,
Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1999), who argued that technical capabilities and central bank
48autonomy were severely lacking in most emerging-market economies (including several that sub-
sequently adopted inﬂation targeting).54 Such countries, the argument goes, would be better oﬀ
sticking with a “conventional” policy framework, such as an exchange-rate peg or money-growth
targeting. The preconditions include (International Monetary Fund (2005, chapt. 4) and Ba-
tini and Laxton (2007)) institutional independence of the central bank; a well-developed technical
infrastructure in terms of forecasting, modeling and data availability; an economy with fully dereg-
ulated prices, not overly sensitive to commodity prices and exchange rates, and with minimal
dollarization; and a healthy ﬁnancial system with sound banks and well-developed capital markets.
To assess the role of preconditions for the adoption of inﬂation targeting, Batini and Laxton
(2007) administered a survey to 21 inﬂation-targeting central banks and 10 non-targeting central
banks in emerging-market countries. The version of the survey given to inﬂation-targeting central
banks focused on how policy was formulated, implemented, and communicated and how various as-
pects of central banking practice had changed before and during the adoption of targeting. Survey
responses were cross-checked with independent primary and secondary sources and in many cases
augmented with “hard” economic data. The evidence indicates that no inﬂation targeter had all
the preconditions in place before adopting inﬂation targeting. Furthermore, their evidence suggests
that it does not appear to be necessary for emerging-market countries to meet a stringent set of
institutional, technical, and economic preconditions before successfully adopting inﬂation target-
ing. Instead, the feasibility and success of targeting appears to depend more on the authorities’
commitment and ability to plan and drive institutional change after introducing targeting. Con-
sequently, policy advice to countries that are interested in adopting targeting could usefully focus
on the institutional and technical goals central banks should strive for during and after adopting
targeting in order to maximize its potential beneﬁts.
In a study of the experiences of Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, South Africa,
and Turkey, de Mello (2008) concludes that many of the preconditions associated with inﬂation
targeting had not been fulﬁlled when these countries adopted inﬂation targeting. Nevertheless, he
ﬁnds that “these deﬁciencies have not undermined the implementation of inﬂation targeting where
policy eﬀorts have been focused on addressing them” (p. 10).
In an extensive survey, Freedman and Ötker-Robe (2009) describe the experiences of a number
54 Others who stressed the conceptual relevance of “preconditions” include Agenor (2000); Schaechter, Stone, and
Zelmer (2000); Carare, Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2002); Khan (2003); and the May 2001 World Economic
Outlook. See also Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997). More neutral or benign views on the conceptual relevance
of “preconditions” can instead be found in Truman (2003); Jonas and Mishkin (2003); Debelle (2001); and Amato
and Gerlach (2002).
49of countries with the introduction and implementation of inﬂation targeting regimes, and discuss
how they fared in meeting the various conditions that some have argued are needed in advance of
introducing inﬂation targeting. They ﬁnd that the country experiences are not supportive of the
view that countries have to satisfy a long list of preconditions before adopting inﬂation targeting
but that some elements were important in making the inﬂation-targeting framework more feasible
and less challenging: (i) price stability as the overriding monetary policy goal; (ii) absence of ﬁs-
cal dominance; (iii) central bank instrument independence; (iv) broad domestic consensus on the
prominence of the inﬂation target; (v) some basic understanding of the transmission mechanism,
and a reasonable capacity to aﬀect short-term interest rates; and (vi) reasonably well-functioning
ﬁnancial system and markets. They suggest that these elements could perhaps be viewed as the
conditions conducive to the introduction of a successful inﬂation-targeting framework. In particu-
lar, they conclude: “There is no single most eﬀective path toward adoption of inﬂation targeting.
It would certainly be a mistake to think that all the conditions for a successful implementation of
inﬂation targeting need to be in place before the framework could be launched. As country experi-
ences show, in many countries that now have successful inﬂation targeting, some of the conditions
were not in place at the outset, but the authorities worked over time to establish them, and also
learned by doing. It would similarly be a mistake, however, to think that all the conventional con-
ditions would arrive spontaneously. The central banks have to initiate the process and make their
best eﬀort to establish the true conditions and work with the government toward that objective”
(p. 19—20).
5. Future
This section discusses two potential future issues for inﬂation targeting — whether it would be ad-
vantageous to move on to price-level targeting and whether inﬂation targeting needs to be modiﬁed
in the light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and deep recession.
5.1. Price-level targeting
A possible future issue is whether ﬂexible inﬂation targeting should eventually be transformed into
ﬂexible price-level targeting. Inﬂation targeting as practised implies that past deviations of inﬂation
from target are not undone. This introduces a unit root in the price level and makes the price level
not trend-stationary, that is, nonstationary even after the removal of a deterministic trend. That is,
50the conditional variance of the future price level increases without bound with the horizon. In spite
of this, inﬂation targeting with a low inﬂation rate is referred to as “price stability’. An alternative
monetary-policy regime would be “price-level targeting’, where the objective is to stabilize the price
level around a price-level target.55 That price-level target need not be constant but could follow
a deterministic path corresponding to a steady inﬂation of two percent, for instance. Stability of
the price level around such a price-level target would imply that the price level becomes trend-
stationary, that is, the conditional variance of the price level becomes constant and independent
of the horizon. One beneﬁt of this compared with inﬂation targeting is that long-run uncertainty
about the price level is smaller. Another beneﬁt is that, if the price level falls below a credible
price-level target, inﬂation expectations would rise and reduce the real interest rate even if the
nominal interest rate is unchanged. The reduced real interest rate would stimulate the economy
and bring the price level back to the target. Thus, price-level targeting may imply some automatic
stabilization. This may be highly desirable, especially in situations when the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates is binding, the nominal interest rate cannot be further reduced, and the
economy is in a liquidity trap, as has been the case for several years in Japan (and during the recent
deep recession in several other countries). Whether price-level targeting would have any negative
eﬀects on the real economy remains a topic for current debate and research (Svensson (2002)).
Recently several central banks, especially Bank of Canada, have shown new interest in price-level
targeting and several reviews of new and old research have been published, for instance, Ambler
(2009), Amano, Carter, and Coletti (2009), Deutsche Bundesbank (2010), and Kahn (2009).
5.2. Inﬂation targeting and ﬁnancial stability: Lessons from the ﬁnancial crisis56
At the time of writing (April 2010), the world economy was beginning to recover from the ﬁnancial
crisis and the resulting deep recession of the global economy, and there is a lively debate about what
caused the crisis and how the risks of future crises can be reduced. Some blame loose monetary
policy for laying the foundation for the crisis, and there is also a lively debate about the future
of monetary policy and its relation to ﬁnancial stability. In this section I discuss the lessons for
inﬂation targeting after the crisis. My view is that the crisis was not caused by monetary policy
but mainly by regulatory and supervisory failures in combination with some special circumstances,
55 See Berg and Jonung (1999) for a discussion of the good experience of price-level targeting in Sweden during
the Great Depression.
56 This section builds on Svensson (2009a) and Svensson (2010b). I thank Hanna Armelius, Charles Bean, Claes
Berg, Alan Blinder, Stephen Cecchetti, Hans Dellmo, Chuck Freedman, Charles Goodhart, Björn Lagerwall, Lars
Nyberg, Irma Rosenberg, Hyun Shin, Frank Smets, and Staﬀan Viotti for discussions of these issues.
51such as low world real interest rates and U.S. housing policy. Ultimately, my main conclusion for
monetary policy from the crisis so far is that ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, applied in the right way
and using all the information about ﬁnancial factors that is relevant for the forecast of inﬂation
and resource utilization at any horizon, remains the monetary policy before, during, and after the
ﬁnancial crisis that has the best chance to stabilize both inﬂation and the real economy. But a
better theoretical, empirical, and operational understanding of the role of ﬁnancial factors in the
transmission mechanism is urgently required and needs much work, work that is already underway
in academia and in central banks.
As described in the previous sections, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting means that monetary policy
aims at stabilizing both inﬂation around the inﬂation target and resource utilization around a
normal level, keeping in mind that monetary policy cannot aﬀect the long-term level of resource
utilization. Because of the time lags between monetary-policy actions and their eﬀect on inﬂation
and the real economy, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is more eﬀective if it relies on forecasts of inﬂation
and the real economy. Therefore, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting can be described as “forecast targeting”:
the central bank chooses a policy-rate path so that the forecast of inﬂation and resource utilization
stabilizes both inﬂation around the inﬂation target and resource utilization around a normal level or
achieves a reasonable compromise between the two. The forecasts of inﬂation and the real economy
are then conditional on the central bank’s view of the transmission mechanism, an estimate of the
current state of the economy and a forecast of important exogenous variables. The central bank
uses all relevant information that has an impact on the forecast of inﬂation and the real economy.
In this framework, the central bank takes ﬁnancial conditions such as credit growth, asset prices,
imbalances, potential asset price bubbles and so on into account only to the extent that they have
an impact on the forecast of inﬂation and resource utilization. Inﬂation and resource utilization are
target variables, that is, variables that the central bank tries to stabilize. Financial conditions are
not target variables. Instead, they are only indicators, as they provide information to the central
bank about the state of the economy, the transmission mechanism and exogenous shocks. Financial
conditions then aﬀect policy rates only to the extent that they have an impact on the forecast of
inﬂation and resource utilization.
Now, is there any reason to modify this view of monetary policy given the experience of the
ﬁnancial crisis so far? Let me approach this question by ﬁrst asking what the causes of the ﬁnancial
crisis were, whether monetary policy contributed to the crisis, and whether a diﬀerent monetary
policy was warranted and could have prevented or reduced the size of the crisis.
525.2.1. Did monetary policy contribute to the crisis, and could diﬀerent monetary policy
have prevented the crisis?
Many have claimed that excessively easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve after 2001 helped
cause a bubble in house prices in the U.S., a bubble whose inevitable bursting proved to be a major
source of the ﬁnancial crisis.57 However, as I see it, the crisis was mainly caused by factors that
had very little to do with monetary policy and were mostly due to background macro conditions,
distorted incentives in ﬁnancial markets, regulatory and supervisory failures (also when central
banks have been responsible for regulation and supervision), information problems, and some spe-
ciﬁc circumstances, including the U.S. housing policy to support home ownership for low-income
households.58
The macro conditions preceding the crisis included low world real interest rates associated with
global imbalances, as well as the Great Moderation, with a long period of very stable growth and
stable low inﬂation, which led to a systematic underestimation of risk and very low risk premia in
ﬁnancial markets. There were distorted incentives for commercial and investment banks to increase
leverage that were made possible by lax regulation and supervision and the lack of an appropriate
bank resolution regime. There were also distorted incentives to exercise less due diligence in loan
origination because of securitization and to conduct regulatory arbitrage by setting up oﬀ-balance-
sheet entities, which for various speciﬁc reasons ended up still eﬀectively remaining on the balance
sheet. There were also distorted incentives for traders and fund managers to take excessive risks
because of myopic and asymmetric remuneration contracts. There were eventually enormous in-
formation problems in assessing the risks of extremely complex asset-backed securities, and there
was a huge underestimation of the potential for correlated systemic risks. None of these causes had
anything to do with monetary policy, except that monetary policy may have contributed to the
Great Moderation.
Regarding the role of Federal Reserve monetary policy in the crisis, there are two relevant
questions. First, was the low interest rate reasonable given the information available at the time?
Second, could a diﬀerent monetary policy with higher interest rates have prevented the crisis? The
ﬁrst question, whether the low interest rate was reasonable given the available information, is the
57 See, for instance, Taylor (2007).
58 See Bean (2009) for an extensive and excellent discussion of the crisis, including the credit expansion and
housing boom, the macroeconomic antecedents, the distorted incentives, the information problems, the ampliﬁcation
and propagation of the crisis into the real economy, the policy responses, and the lessons for monetary policy and
economics generally. Bank for International Settlements (2009) provides a more detailed account of the possible
macro- and microeconomic causes of the crisis.
53relevant one when evaluating monetary policy. It is more relevant to evaluate policy taking into
account the information available ex ante to the policymaker rather than information ex post that
was unknown to the policymaker at the time (see Svensson (2010a) on evaluating monetary policy
ex ante and ex post). During the period in question, given the information available, there was a
genuine and well-motivated fear of the U.S. falling into a Japanese-style deﬂationary liquidity trap,
and the optimal policy in such a situation is a very expansionary monetary policy.59 It may be
that, in retrospect, the risk of deﬂation was exaggerated, but there was no way to know this ex
ante. Hence, I consider the expansionary policy very appropriate. Adding some ex post evaluation,
one can note that it did not lead ex post to very high inﬂation or an overheated economy.60
The second question, whether a diﬀerent monetary policy could have prevented the crisis, is
relevant when assessing to what extent monetary policy can be blamed for causing the crisis,
notwithstanding if it was reasonable from an ex ante perspective. The credit growth and the
housing boom in the U.S. and elsewhere were very powerful. Real interest rates were low to a large
extent because of global imbalances, and the global saving glut and investment shortage. I believe
that somewhat higher interest rates would have made little or no diﬀerence. Empirical evidence
indicates that only a small portion of house-price increases can be attributed to monetary policy.61
Bernanke (2010) shows that the recent phenomenon of a higher share of adjustable-rate mortgages
was unlikely to have signiﬁcantly increased the sensitivity of house prices to monetary policy. The
availability of new, more exotic mortgage types mattered much more for initial mortgage payments
than the level of short-term interest rates. In my view, interest rates would probably have had to be
raised very high so as to cause considerable damage to the real economy in order to stop the credit
growth and housing boom. That could have thrown the U.S. right into Japanese-style deﬂation
and eventually a liquidity trap.62 Certainly, higher interest rates would have had no impact on
the regulatory problems, distorted incentives and information problems mentioned above (although
they could have ended the Great Moderation with a deep recession and deﬂation).63
59 See Svensson (2003a) for a discussion of policy options before and in a liquidity trap.
60 Bernanke (2010) shows that Fed policy rates do not seem excessively low given real-time FOMC forecasts. See
also Dokko, Doyle, Kiley, Kim et al. (2009).
61 See Del Negro and Otrok (2007), Jarocinski and Smets (2008), Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2008), and Iacoviello
and Neri (2008).
62 Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2009) study the responses of residential property and equity prices, inﬂation
and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries in the period 1986-2007, using single-country VARs
and panel VARs in which they distinguish between groups of countries depending on their ﬁnancial systems. The
eﬀect of monetary policy shocks on GDP is about a third of the eﬀect on property prices. Thus, to increase policy
rates so as to lower property prices by 15 percent would result in 5 percent lower GDP.
63 Kohn (2008), after extensive discussion, concludes that there is insuﬃcient evidence that low interest rates would
have contributed much to the house-price boom and that higher interest rates would have had much dampening eﬀect
on it.
54However, going beyond the Federal Reserve’s actual monetary policy, perhaps it is possible that
the emphasis on its readiness to relax monetary policy aggressively in the wake of a sharp fall in
asset prices, as expressed by Greenspan (2002) for example, may have induced expectations of a
ﬂoor under future asset prices and contributed to the asset-price boom, the so-called Greenspan
put (Miller, Weller, and Zhang (2002)). Arguably, this is more of a communication issue than one
of actual policy, and less emphasis on the readiness to clean up after a sharp fall in asset prices
might have been a preferable alternative.
The IMF (International Monetary Fund (2009, chapt. 3)) has investigated the role of monetary
policy in causing ﬁnancial crises. A large number of countries and ﬁnancial crises were included in
the sample. The conclusion is that “the stance of monetary policy has not generally been a good
leading indicator of future house price busts...There is some association between loose monetary
policy and house price rises in the years leading up to the current crisis in some countries, but loose
monetary policy was not the main, systematic cause of the boom and consequent bust.” Further-
more, the overall relationship between the stance of monetary policy and house-price appreciation
across countries in the years before the current crisis is statistically insigniﬁcant and economically
weak, and monetary policy diﬀerences explain only about 5 percent of the variability in house price
appreciation across countries.64
What conclusions can we draw so far from the ﬁnancial crisis about the conduct of monetary
policy and any need to modify the framework of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting? One obvious conclusion
is that price stability is not enough to achieve ﬁnancial stability (Carney (2003), White (2006)).
Good ﬂexible inﬂation targeting by itself does not achieve ﬁnancial stability, if anyone ever believed
it would.
Another conclusion is that interest-rate policy is not enough to achieve ﬁnancial stability. Spe-
ciﬁc policies and instruments are needed to ensure ﬁnancial stability. Instruments like supervision
and regulation, including appropriate bank resolution regimes, are more eﬀective in promoting ﬁ-
nancial stability. In many countries, the responsibility for these instruments rests on authorities
other than the central bank. Generally, to the extent ﬁnancial instability depends on speciﬁcd i s -
tortions, regulation is most eﬀective if it aims to attack these distortions as close to the source as
possible. To counter the observed procyclicality of existing regulation, macro-prudential regula-
tion that is contingent on the business cycle and ﬁnancial indicators may need to be introduced
64 The relationship for the euro area countries is less weak, but for reasons explained by Bernanke (2010) it is
potentially overstated. See also Dokko, Doyle, Kiley, Kim et al. (2009).
55to induce better ﬁnancial stability. Possible macro-prudential regulation includes variable capital,
margin, and equity/loan requirements. As expressed by Bean (2009), “the best approach is likely
to involve a portfolio of instruments.”
5.2.2. Distinguish monetary policy and ﬁnancial-stability policy
More generally, what is the relation between ﬁnancial stability and monetary policy? Financial
stability is an important objective of economic policy. A possible deﬁnition of ﬁnancial stability
is a situation when the ﬁnancial system can fulﬁl its main functions (of submitting payments,
channeling saving into investment, and providing risk sharing) without disturbances that have
signiﬁcant social costs. I ﬁnd it helpful to conceptually distinguish ﬁnancial-stability policy from
monetary policy. Diﬀerent economic policies and policy areas, such as ﬁscal policy, labor market
policy, structural policies to improve competition, etc., can be distinguished according to their
objectives, the policy instruments that are suitable for achieving the objectives, and the authority
or authorities controlling the instruments and responsible for achieving the objectives.
Monetary policy in the form of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting has the objective of stabilizing both
inﬂation around the inﬂation target and resource utilization around a normal level. The suitable
instruments are under normal circumstances the policy rate and communication, including possibly
a published policy-rate path and a forecast of inﬂation and the real economy. In times of crisis, as
we have seen during the current crisis, other more unconventional instruments can be used, such as
ﬁxed-rate lending at longer maturities, asset purchases (quantitative easing), and foreign-exchange
intervention to prevent currency appreciation. The authority responsible for monetary policy is
typically the central bank.
T h eo b j e c t i v eo fﬁnancial-stability policy is maintaining or promoting ﬁnancial stability. Under
normal circumstances the available instruments are supervision, regulation, and ﬁnancial-stability
reports with analyses and leading indicators that may provide early warnings of stability threats. In
times of crisis, there are instruments such as lending of last resort, variable-rate lending at longer
maturities (credit policy, credit easing), special resolution regimes for ﬁnancial ﬁrms in trouble,
government lending guarantees, government capital injections, and so forth.65 The responsible
authority or authorities vary across countries. In some countries it is the central bank, in other
65 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) develop a canonical framework to help organize thinking about credit market
frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis. They use the framework to discuss
how disruptions in ﬁnancial intermediation can induce a crisis that aﬀects real activity and to illustrate how various
credit market interventions by the central bank and/or the Treasury of the type seen during the crisis might work to
mitigate the crisis.
56countries there is a separate ﬁnancial supervisory authority, sometimes the responsibility is shared
between diﬀerent institutions. In Sweden, the Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for
supervision and regulation, the Riksbank is responsible for lending of last resort to solvent banks
and for promoting a safe and eﬃcient payment system, while the National Debt Oﬃce is responsible
for bank guarantees and the resolution of failed banks. During times of crisis, these authorities
cooperate closely with the Ministry of Finance.
My point here is that ﬁnancial-stability policy and monetary policy are quite diﬀerent, with
diﬀerent objectives, instruments, and responsible authorities, the latter with considerable diﬀerences
across countries. This does not mean that there is no interaction between them. Financial stability
directly aﬀects the ﬁnancial markets, and ﬁnancial conditions aﬀect the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. Problems in ﬁnancial markets may have a drastic eﬀect on the real economy,
as the current ﬁnancial crisis has shown. Monetary policy aﬀects asset prices and balance sheets
and can thereby aﬀect ﬁnancial stability. But the fact that ﬁnancial-stability policy and monetary
policy are conceptually distinct, with distinct objectives and distinct suitable instruments, has
to be taken into account when considering the lessons of the ﬁnancial crisis for monetary policy.
Thus, because the policy rate is a blunt and unsuitable instrument for achieving ﬁnancial stability,
it makes little sense to assign the objective of ﬁnancial stability to monetary policy, although it
may make sense assign that objective to the central bank, if the central bank gets control of the
appropriate supervisory and regulatory instruments.66
5.2.3. Conclusions for ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
What are the speciﬁc conclusions for ﬂexible inﬂation targeting? One important lesson from the
ﬁnancial crisis is that ﬁnancial factors may have a very strong and deteriorating eﬀect on the trans-
mission mechanism, making standard interest-rate policy much less eﬀective. This motivates more
research on how to incorporate ﬁnancial factors into the standard models of the transmission mech-
anism used by central banks. A rapidly-increasing volume of such research is now being produced
by academic and central-bank researchers and presented at an increasing number of conferences on
ﬁnancial factors and monetary policy. Important and challenging questions include how potential
output and neutral real interest rates are aﬀected by ﬁnancial factors and ﬁnancial distortions (Cur-
dia and Woodford (2009), Walsh (2009b)), and what impact ﬁnancial factors have on the general
66 Blinder (2010) discusses how much of the responsibility for ﬁnancial-stability policy should rest with the central
bank.
57equilibrium eﬀects of alternative policy-rate paths on inﬂation and resource utilization forecasts.67
Even with much better analytical foundations concerning the role of ﬁnancial factors in the trans-
mission mechanism, there will of course, as always, be considerable scope for the application of
good judgment in monetary policy.
Another conclusion, which is not new, is that consideration of the impact of ﬁnancial factors
on the forecast of inﬂation and resource utilization may require longer forecast horizons. Several
inﬂation-targeting central banks (including the Bank of England, Norges Bank, and the Riksbank)
have for other reasons already extended their forecast horizon from the previously common two years
to three years. There is nothing that in principle prevents an inﬂation targeter from considering
forecasts beyond a three-year horizon, but in practice there is usually little information about
anything at longer horizons except the tendency to revert to the long-term average.
What about “leaning against the wind” (as advocated by, for instance, Borio and White (2003)
and Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002)), the idea that central banks should raise the interest
rate more than what appears to be warranted by inﬂation and resource utilization to counter rapid
credit growth and rising asset prices? It has sometimes not been quite clear whether advocates of
leaning against the wind mean that credit growth and asset prices should be considered targets and
enter the explicit or implicit loss functions alongside inﬂation and resource utilization, or whether
they mean that credit growth and asset prices should still be considered just indicators and are
emphasized only because credit growth and asset prices may have potential negative eﬀects on
inﬂation and resource utilization at a longer horizon. In the latter case, leaning against the wind
is a way to improve the stability of inﬂation and resource utilization in the longer run. Then it is
completely consistent with ﬂexible inﬂation targeting.68
However, in line with the previous discussion, instruments other than interest rates are likely to
be much more eﬀective in avoiding excessive credit growth and asset- price booms, and are therefore
more appropriate to use as a ﬁrst-best alternative. Interest rates that are high enough to have a
noticeable eﬀect on credit growth and asset prices may have strong negative eﬀects on inﬂation and
67 Walsh (2009b) points out that when ﬁnancial factors cause distortions, these distortions will in general introduce
corresponding terms in a loss function for monetary policy that is a second-order approximation to household welfare.
Curdia and Woodford (2009) present a model where the second-order welfare approximation is a standard quadratic
loss function of inﬂation and the output gap between output and potential output, but where potential output is
aﬀected by ﬁnancial factors. Then inﬂation and the output gap remain the target variables, with and without ﬁnancial
factors. The neutral rate in the model, that is, the real rate consistent with output equal to potential output, is then
also aﬀected by ﬁnancial factors.
68 Adrian and Shin (2010a) and Adrian and Shin (2010b) argue, in a model with a risk-taking channel as in
Borio and Zhu (2008), that short interest-rate movements may have considerable eﬀects on the leverage of securities
broker-dealers in the market-based ﬁnancial sector outside the commercial-banking sector. However, new regulation
may aﬀect the magnitude of these aﬀe c t s ,a n dt h es i z eo ft h em a r k e t - b a s e dﬁnancial sector may end up being smaller
after the crisis. In Europe, the commercial banks dominate the ﬁnancial sector.
58resource utilization, and a central bank will probably rarely have suﬃcient information about the
likely beneﬁcial longer-horizon eﬀects on inﬂation and resource utilization for the trade-oﬀ to be
worthwhile and motivated.69
In particular, if there is evidence of rapidly rising house prices and mortgage loans, and these
developments are deemed to be unsustainable and a possible bubble, there are much more eﬀective
instruments than policy rates. Restrictions on loan-to-value ratios and requirements of realistic
cash-ﬂow calculations for house buyers with realistic interest rates are much more eﬀective in putting
a break on possible unsustainable developments than a rise in the policy rates. In particular, more
transparency about future policy rates, in the form a policy-rate path published by the central
bank, may help in providing realistic information about future interest rates.
Suppose, however, that, for some reason, the appropriate and eﬀective instruments to ensure
ﬁnancial stability are not available, for instance, because of serious problems with the regulatory and
supervisory framework that cannot be remedied in the short run. In such a second-best situation,
if there is a threat to ﬁnancial stability, one may argue that, to the extent that policy rates do have
an impact on ﬁnancial stability, that impact should be taken into consideration when choosing the
policy-rate path to best stabilize inﬂation and resource utilization. Such considerations could result
in a lower or higher policy-rate path than otherwise, in order to trade oﬀ less eﬀective stabilization
of inﬂation and resource utilization for more ﬁnancial stability. However, so far all of the evidence
indicates that in normal times that tradeoﬀ is very unfavorable, in the sense that the impact of
policy rates on ﬁnancial stability is quite small and the impact on inﬂation and resource utilization
is signiﬁcantly larger, so an optimal tradeoﬀ would still have little impact on ﬁnancial stability. A
good ﬁnancial-stability policy framework is necessary to ensure ﬁnancial stability. Monetary policy
cannot serve as a substitute.
Ultimately, my main conclusion from the crisis so far is that ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, applied
in the right way and using all the information about ﬁnancial factors that is relevant for the forecast
of inﬂation and resource utilization at any horizon, remains the monetary policy before, during, and
after the ﬁnancial crisis that has the best chance to stabilize both inﬂation and the real economy.
But a better theoretical, empirical and operational understanding of the role of ﬁnancial factors
in the transmission mechanism is urgently required and needs much work, work that is already
69 Kohn (2006) speciﬁes three conditions that should be fulﬁlled for central banks to take “extra action” to deal
with a possible asset-price bubble: “First, policymakers must be able to identify bubbles in a timely fashion with
reasonable conﬁdence. Second, a somewhat tighter monetary policy must have a high probability that it will help to
check at least some of the speculative activity. And third, the expected improvement in future economic performance
that would result from the curtailment of the bubble must be suﬃciently great.” He concludes, also in Kohn (2008)
and after thorough considerations, that those conditions would rarely be met. See also Kohn (2009).
59underway in academia and in central banks.
The outcome might very well be that ﬁnancial factors are considered to have a larger role in
aﬀecting the transmission mechanism and as indicators of future inﬂation and resource utilization.
If so, central banks would end up responding more to ﬁnancial indicators, in the sense of adjusting
the policy rate and policy-rate path more to a given change in a ﬁnancial indicator. However,
this would not mean that ﬁnancial factors and indicators have become independent targets besides
inﬂation and resource utilization in the explicit or implicit central-bank loss function. Instead,
it would be a matter of responding appropriately to ﬁnancial indicators in order to achieve over
time the best possible stabilization of inﬂation around the inﬂation target and resource utilization
around a normal level.
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